Clinton\u27s Little White Lies: The Materiality Requirement for Perjury in Civil Discovery by Heinrich, Alan
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
6-1-1999
Clinton's Little White Lies: The Materiality
Requirement for Perjury in Civil Discovery
Alan Heinrich
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alan Heinrich, Clinton's Little White Lies: The Materiality Requirement for Perjury in Civil Discovery, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1303 (1999).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol32/iss4/19
CLINTON'S LITTLE WHITE LIES: THE
MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT FOR
PERJURY IN CIVIL DISCOVERY
I. WHO CARES?
The Clinton scandal called the nation's attention to the neglected
offense of perjury. It would seem that perjury remains a common
occurrence in criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings, and yet
perjury prosecutions are rare.' Perjury prosecutions based on false
statements made in civil proceedings appear to be particularly rare-
though hardly unprecedented.2 It is not surprising, then, that
Clinton's supporters repeatedly argued that even if Clinton commit-
ted perjury in his deposition for the Jones v. Clinton3 suit, it did not
constitute an impeachable offense, so we should all just forget about
the whole mess and move on.4 In other words: Who cares if Clinton
lied in his deposition concerning his affair with Monica Lewinsky?
Apparently, the House of Representatives did not care-at least
not enough to impeach Clinton for it. The House rejected the second
article of impeachment presented to it by the Judiciary Committee,
which charged that "William Jefferson Clinton, in sworn answers to
written questions asked as part of a Federal civil rights action
brought against him, willfully provided perjurious, false and mis-
leading testimony in response to questions deemed relevant by a
Federal judge .... 5 Nevertheless, Clinton's alleged perjury in his
civil deposition remained the tail that wagged the impeachment dog.
The first article of impeachment passed by the House accused
1. See infra Part II.D.
2. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
3. No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark.)
4. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S 194-96 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999) (Answer of
President William Jefferson Clinton to the Articles of Impeachment).
5. 144 CONG. REC. HI 1774 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1998). The second article
was rejected by a vote of 229-205. See 144 CONG. REC. H12041 (daily ed.
Dec. 19, 1998).
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Clinton of lying about lying in his civil deposition, before a federal
grand jury convened to investigate allegations of perjury in the Jones
suit.6 The other article passed by the House accused Clinton of en-
gaging in conduct designed to conceal the evidence "related to a
Federal civil rights action brought against him in a duly instituted ju-
dicial proceeding."7  It remains to be seen whether Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr will indict Clinton for committing perjury in
the Jones suit.
8
This Comment explores two interrelated legal issues raised by
the Clinton team's "Who cares?" response to allegations that Clinton
perjured himself in the Jones suit.
First, the applicable federal perjury statutes-18 U.S.C. §§ 1621
and 1623-contain their own built-in "Who cares?" defense: a de-
fendant cannot be prosecuted for telling trivial lies, even if the de-
fendant told such lies under oath and before a judge. Perjury re-
quires false statements that were actually "material" to the
underlying proceedings.9 However, it is not clear how the require-
ment of materiality should be applied in the context of civil discov-
ery. The federal circuits are split on the issue.' 0  Should every
knowingly false answer to questions within the legitimate scope of
discovery be deemed material? Or should materiality be construed
more narrowly? For example, should materiality depend on whether
the false statements could have been admitted into evidence at a sub-
sequent trial and, if so, whether they actually could have affected the
outcome of that trial?
Second, and more fundamentally, why should the State care
about lies made during the preliminary stages of a private lawsuit, to
the point of actually criminalizing such lying? Can the State be ex-
pected to police the hundreds of millions of discovery documents
produced each year in civil litigation in an effective, efficient, and
fair manner? The scope of the materiality requirement, which repre-
sents a limitation on perjury liability, should be defined in light of
6. See 144 CONG. REC. Hl1774 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1998).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Don Van Natta Jr., Starr is Weighing Whether to Indict Sitting
President, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 31, 1999, at 1 (suggesting that Starr may indict
Clinton for pejury).
9. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621(1), 1623(a) (1994).
10. See infra Part III.
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the practical difficulties of criminalizing false statements made in
private lawsuits.
This Comment uses the Clinton affair as a vehicle for studying
the definition of materiality in prosecutions for perjury based on civil
discovery." Part II surveys the history, purpose, and prevalence of
perjury prosecutions. Part III analyzes the case law on the material-
ity requirement in the civil discovery context and proposes a narrow
standard for materiality in this context. Part III also contends that
there are more appropriate tools for policing discovery than perjury
prosecutions-in particular, trial courts' sanction and contempt pow-
ers and the inherent checks of the adversarial system itself. Part IV
applies the approaches to materiality reviewed in Part III to Jones v.
Clinton, concluding that Clinton's false deposition testimony re-
garding Monica Lewinsky was not material to the Jones suit.
II. THE NEGLECTED OFFENSE OF PERJURY
A. Historical Background on Perjury
The history of perjury is fraught with controversy.' 2 A number
of eminent legal historians' 3 have concluded that perjury was not a
common law crime before the Perjury Statute of 1563.14 In the
words of Pollock and Maitland, "our ancestors perjured themselves
11. It should be noted at the outset that this Comment focuses solely on
Clinton's deposition testimony regarding his affair with Monica Lewinsky.
For the purposes of this Article, this testimony is assumed to have been know-
ingly false. This Article does not address the possibility that Clinton's denial
of making sexual advances on other women was perjurious. Nor does it ad-
dress the question of whether Clinton committed perjury before a federal grand
jury or was guilty of obstructing justice.
12. See Michael D. Gordon, The Invention of a Common Law Crime: Per-
jury and the Elizabethan Courts, 24 AM. J.L. HIST. 145, 146-51 (1980).
13. See, e.g., 2 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 366 (3d
ed. 1923); THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 436 (5th ed. 1956); 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I
542-43 (Lawyers Literary Club 2d ed. 1959); 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 240-50 (London, MacMillan 1883);
JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE OF EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 17, 100-01 (1898).
14. 5 Eliz., ch. 9 (1563) (Eng.).
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with impunity."' 5 While historians have not universally accepted
this position,16 it appears that early English law regarded perjury
primarily as a religious offense. It was left to God to punish peijur-
ers.17
The rather late appearance of the offense of perjury may be at-
tributed, in part, to the emergence of the modem jury trial, based on
witness testimony. 18 The Perjury Statute of 1563 punished witnesses
who provided false testimony.' 9 As Milsom remarked, prior to the
Sixteenth Century, "[p]erjury by witnesses... could not be a com-
mon law offence because witnesses had no formal existence."
20
But such reference to the genesis of the modem jury trial does
not fully explain the late appearance of perjury as a common law de-
fense. Oath-taking was also central to the form of proof known as
wager of law, or the party oath, which predated trial by witnesses.
21
15. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 543.
16. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138. See
Gordon, supra note 12, at 146-51 for a discussion of the debate.
17. See HENRY CHARLES LEA, THE DUEL AND THE OATH 32 (Edward Pe-
ters ed. & Arthur C. Howland trans., Univ. of Pa. Press 1974) (1866) (stating
that "the legends are numerous which record how the perjured sinner was
stricken down senseless or rendered rigid and motionless in the act of swearing
falsely"). The one form of perjury unquestionably recognized at common law
was attaint-perjury by the jury. Under the writ of attaint, a jury's verdict
could be brought before a new jury of twenty-four men; if the new jury dis-
agreed with the first verdict, the first jury would face serious punishment.
Thus, unlike modem perjury, attaint imposed punishment for innocent and
knowing falsehood alike. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 542.
However, attaint was not available where the parties "'put themselves' upon a
jury" but was limited to assizes, where the jury sat by royal ordinance-and
even then, it was only punished in a "casual and incidental fashion." Id. at
541-42. Attaint was abolished by the celebrated Bushel's Case, 124 Eng. Rep.
1006 (C.P. 1670) (Eng.).
18. See THAYER, supra note 13, at 122-36; PLUCKNETr, supra note 13, at
435-36; 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
575, at 800-02 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
19. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 13, at 436. It should be noted that parties
were not competent to testify as witnesses until the nineteenth century. See 2
WIGMORE, supra note 18, §§ 575, 576, at 804-08, 817-18.
20. S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 366
(1969).
21. See, e.g., LEA, supra note 17, at 13-99; Helen Silving, The Oath: I, 68
YALE L.J. 1329, 1335-36, 1364 (1959); THAYER, supra note 13, at 24-34. Un-
der wager of law, "[i]f a defendant on oath and in a set form of words will
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Here, too, it appears that a party was not liable for perjury even if
manifest evidence was introduced that the party swore falsely in
waging his law.22  For example, Gouldsborough reported that in
1587, the Star Chamber ruled that an individual could not be held for
perjury despite falsely waging his law: "allthough that he make a
false oath, yet he shall not therefore be impeached by bill in the Star-
chamber; and the reason was, because it is as strong as a tryall.,
23
Similarly, in Slade's Case,24 Lord Coke reported that where the
defendant is permitted to wage his law, such as in an action of debt,
his oath is final--'usjurandum in hoc casu est finis"-- "for the
plaintiff is bound thereby, and it is the end of the controversy."
25
Thus, defendants were prevented from waging their law in as many
suits as possible-as they were prevented from doing in actions on
the case-for "experience proves that men's consciences grow so
large that the respect of their private advantage rather induces men
... to perjury."2  Lord Coke bemoaned the fact that "in these days
so little consideration is made of an oath," even though it is a relig-
ious act to swear by God.27 In fact, Coke remarked, the party oath is
the devil's current instrument of choice for dragging lost souls down
to hell.28 Nevertheless, defendants considered it their "birthright" to
submit their oath in this way-committing perjury with impunity
until their day of judgment-and wager of law was not officially put
to rest until 1833.29
In the modem era, perjury has been transformed from a crime
against God to a crime against the State.30 The courts have described
deny the charge against him, and if he can get a certain number of other per-
sons (compurgators) to back his denial by their oaths, he will win his case." 1
W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 305 (3d ed. 1922) (footnote
omitted).
22. See LEA, supra note 17, at 22-24 & n.5; Silving, supra note 21, at 1387-
88.
23. 75 Eng. Rep. 988 (K.B. 1587); see THAYER, supra note 13, at 30.
24. 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1602).
25. Id. at 1079.
26. Id. at 1078.
27. Id. at 1079.
28. See id. at 1078 ('urare in propria causa .. .est saepenumero hoc
seculo praecipitium diaboli ad detrudendas miserorum animas ad infernwn")
(English paraphrase above).
29. See Silving, supra note 21, at 1363.
30. See id. at 1382 ("The state increasingly, though imperceptibly, adapted
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perjury as a serious offense against the judicial process itself. Thus,
the Model Penal Code classifies perjury as a "Government Function
Offense."' 31 In Miles v. State,32 a case involving a defendant charged
with perjury stemming from a civil proceeding, the Criminal Court
of Appeals of Oklahoma declaimed:
This case has been advanced on the docket because of its
peculiar importance. Perjury corrupts and defiles the
stream of justice. Every effort should be used to thwart the
slightest temptation to resort to it. All courts should be
vigilant, in their endeavors to punish perjury, and those who
seek to make use of it as an instrument of fraud. Delay in
so doing places a premium on perjury and in the eyes of the
public makes a mockery of judicial administration. Let this
case stand as a beacon light of expectancy to those who
would resort to false swearing as a means of consummating
the perfidious objectives of rascality.
Extending this sentiment-albeit without the same rhetorical
flourish-the Second Circuit has described perjury as a crime against
the administration of justice in the abstract. It works its harm even
when it does not compromise any particular proceedings:
[t]he purpose of the perjury statute... is to keep the proc-
ess of justice free from the contamination of false testi-
mony. It is for the wrong done to the courts and the ad-
ministration of justice that punishment is given, not for the
effect that any particular testimony might have on the out-
come of any given trial.34
Similarly, in United States v. Holland,35 the Eleventh Circuit
vehemently rejected the notion that "perjury is somehow less serious
when made in a civil proceeding" because it "results in incalculable
harm to the functioning and integrity of the legal system as well as to
the allegedly 'religious' notion of the oath to its own practical needs .... The
state assumed what had been the status of the Divinity and of the Church, as
the authority to whom 'truth'-truth per se-is due, regardless of the results of
falsehood.").
31. MODEL PENAL CODE § 241 (1980).
32. 268 P.2d 290 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954).
33. Id. at 294.
34. United States v. Manfredonia, 414 F.2d 760, 764 (2d Cir. 1969).
35. 22 F.3d 1040 (1 lth Cir. 1994).
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private individuals. '36 The court held that the defendant was not en-
titled to a downward departure under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines simply because he committed perjury in civil rather than
criminal proceedings.
37
The Eleventh Circuit's dictum that civil perjury is no less seri-
ous than criminal perjury-despite the vastly different stakes of the
two proceedings-recalls Jeremy Bentham's critique of the English
approach to perjury. Bentham faulted the English legal system for
failing to account for the differing degrees of perjury and argued that
perjury should be punished according to the "species and degree of
mischief that in each instance might be expected to result from the
violation of the testimonial truth.' 38 He imagined two examples of
false testimony to illustrate his position: in the first, a witness' false
testimony resulted in his own father's execution, while in the second,
the witness' false testimony resulted in his neighbor's wrongful con-
viction for littering.39  Any criminal system that punishes such
crimes equally has failed to achieve proportionality in punishment.
In fact, the United States Sentencing Guidelines address Ben-
tham's general concerns-but only up to a point. Section 2J1.3,
which governs perjury, calls for a three level sentencing increase
where the defendant's perjury "resulted in substantial interference
with the administration of justice."40 According to the Guidelines'
Commentary, "substantial interference" includes "premature or im-
proper termination of a felony investigation; an indictment, verdict,
or any judicial determination based upon perjy... or the unneces-
sary expenditure of substantial governmental or court resources."
41
However, as a means of curing the defects in the law of perjury that
Bentham condemned, section 2J1.3(b)(2) is overinclusive: it fails to
distinguish between perjury that results in criminal conviction or ac-
quittal and perjury that simply wastes the court's time.42 Thus, both
36. Id. at 1047.
37. See id. at 1048.
38. 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 368-69 (Fred
B. Rothman & Co. 1995) (1827).
39. See id. at 367.
40. U.S. SENTENCING GuIDELINEs MANUAL § 2J1.3(b)(2) (Nov. 1998)
[hereinafter USSG].
41. Id., commentary (n.1).
42. The Second Circuit has suggested that the court resources consumed by
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perjurers in Bentham's example would be eligible for the "substan-
tial interference" enhancement.
Subsection 2J1.3(c) presents another basis for enhancing a per-
jurer's sentence. This subsection states that a defendant who com-
mitted perjury "in respect to" a criminal offense is to be punished as
an "accessory after the fact" for that offense.43 However, there are
no recorded cases in which this enhancement was imposed on a gov-
ernment witness who committed perjury against a criminal defen-
dant-perhaps because it would be conceptually perverse to sentence
the defendant as an accessory to a crime that he or she was helping to
prosecute.44 This time, it would appear that in many situations nei-
ther of Bentham's hypothetical perjurers would be eligible for the
section 2J1.3(c) enhancement. Thus, section 2J1.3(c) is underinclu-
sive.
In contrast, the Frenchpunish perjurers more in accordance with
the nature of the mischief.4 Under French law, perjurers in criminal
proceedings suffer greater punishment than civil perjurers.46 Perjury
committed in civil proceedings is subject to two to five years' im-
prisonment.47 Perjury committed in criminal proceedings is subject
the defendant's perjury trial itself may properly be considered under section
2J1.3(b)(2), although this is probably not enough, standing alone, to justify the
three level enhancement. See United States v. DeSalvo, 26 F.3d 1216, 1223-24
(2d Cir. 1994). This would make subsection (b)(2) even more overinclusive.
But see United States v. Duran, 41 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that
court may not enhance sentence under 2J1.3(b)(2) because of court time
wasted on defendant's perjury trial).
43. USSG § 2J1.3(c)(1) (Nov. 1998). Of course, in no event may a defen-
dant be sentenced to more than the statutory maximum for perjury, which is 5
years under both §§ 1621 and 1623.
44. See United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 331 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding
that section 2J1.3(c)(1) applies if defendant lied in order to protect himself or
to assist another person in avoiding punishment, citing USSG § 2J1.2, com-
mentary. (backg'd) (Nov. 1998), which states that the enhancement was aimed
at conduct designed to "avoid punishment for an offense that the defendant has
committed or to assist another person to escape punishment for an offense...
."). Heater's reasoning suggests that section 2J1.3(c)(1) does not apply where
the defendant was testifying for the government when he or she committed
perjury.
45. Similarly, under Biblical law, perjurers were punished according to the
lex talionis; the same punishment was inflicted on them as they inflicted on
those they testified falsely against. See Deuteronomy 19:18, 19.
46. See CODE PtNAL [C. PtN.] arts. 361, 363 (Fr.).
47. See C. PtN. art. 363.
1310
PERJURY IN CIVIL DISCOVERY
to five to ten years' imprisonment. 48 However, if the perjurer testi-
fied against a criminal defendant, and the defendant was convicted
and sentenced to more than five to ten years' imprisonment, the per-
jurer is to suffer the same sentence ordained for the criminal defen-
dant.
49
B. The Materiality Requirement
There is a further problem with the "government function of-
fense" approach to perjury. To punish false testimony without re-
gard "for the effect that any particular testimony might have on the
outcome of any given trial,' 50 as the Second Circuit advocated in
Manfredonia, risks reading out of the federal perjury statutes an es-
sential element of the offense, namely, materiality.5 ' Perjury is not
simply an offense against the administration of justice. Some judicial
lies are not punishable as perjury; only those lies that have the "natu-
ral tendency" to affect the outcome of the proceedings constitute
perjur.. 52 In other words, perjury requires a material false state-
ment.
3
In effect, the materiality requirement in modem perjury statutes
represents a compromise between two competing conceptions of the
nature of the offense. On the one hand, perjury consists in "the ab-
stract jeopardy ofjudicial security" regardless of its actual effects on
a given decision.5 4 On the other hand, perjury is a species of fraud
that injures the legal rights of others.5 5 These positions may not be
fully reconcilable; the consequence of this conflict is inconsistency
in the courts' application of the materiality requirement.
From the earliest times in Anglo-American law, the offense of
perjury has included a materiality requirement. Lord Coke stated
48. See C. PtN. art 361.
49. See id.
50. Manfredonia, 414 F.2d at 764.
51. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (holding that
materiality is an essential element of a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1623).
52. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988).
53. See 70 C.J.S. § 12 (materiality is element of perjury at common law);
Kungys, 485 U.S. at 769.
54. Silving, supra note 21, at 1387.
55. See id. at 1386-87 (discussing the debate on the nature of perjury
among the great German criminal theorists, Feuerbach, Mittermaler and von
Liszt).
1311June 1999]
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:1303
that perjury consists of swearing falsely "in a matter materiall to the
issue, or cause in question."56 He explained:
For if it be not materiall, then though it be false, yet it is no
perjury, because it concemeth not the point in suit, and
therefore in effect it is extrajudiciall. Also this act giveth
remedy to the party grieved, and if the deposition be not
materiall, he cannot be grieved thereby.
57
The materiality requirement limits perjury liability to situations
where the defendant made knowingly false statements that at least
had the potential to affect the rights of another. If an individual testi-
fies falsely to an immaterial matter, he has at most committed the of-
fense of false swearing, a simple misdemeanor in the jurisdictions
that recognize the offense at all.58 As one court noted, false swearing
is "'designed to promote the policy of discouraging all the falsehoods
made under oath, even where there has been no substantial impair-
ment of the administration of justice."' 59 In contrast, perjury only
targets false statements that have the capacity to cause such a "sub-
stantial impairment of the administration of justice."60 Accordingly,
perjury is a felony under federal law. The materiality requirement
therefore ensures that an individual does not face serious punishment
for a "declaration which pertained to a matter of little significance in
the context of ajudicial proceeding."3
61
While there may be strong reasons for somehow sanctioning all
false testimony given in a judicial proceeding, the nature and extent
of the sanction should be determined by the potential for harm posed
by the defendant's false testimony, as Bentham argued. This brings
us to the conception of perjury as fraud. Such a conception is intui-
tively appealing, for it is much easier to recognize the actual harm
done to a particular individual as a result of perjured testimony than
it is to discern the "incalculable harm" thereby caused to the
56. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND * 164.
57. Id. at ch. 74 § 167.
58. See 70 C.J.S. Perjury § 12 (1996) ("Materiality is not an element of the
statutory crime of false swearing .... ").
59. Commonwealth v. Stallard, 958 S.W.2d 21, 25 (Ky. 1997) (quoting the
Official Commentary to Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated § 523.040,
Kentucky's False Swearing statute).
60. Id.
61. United States v. Harvey, 657 F. Supp. 111, 116 (E.D. Tenn. 1987).
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administration of justice in the abstract. Thus, throughout the im-
peachment drama, a number of Republicans argued that President
Clinton's false deposition testimony was a serious-in fact, an im-
peachable-offense precisely because, they claimed, it prejudiced
Paula Jones's civil suit. For example, Republican Representative
Rogan declared that Clinton's deposition testimony was "designed to
defeat Paula Jones' right to pursue her sexual harassment civil rights
lawsuit."62  Republican Representative Gekas contended that
Clinton's conduct amounted to an "attempt to obliterate the Paula
Jones civil suit."' 63 Gekas continued:
That is what it is, not that he committed perjury. So what?
It is what the end result of that perjury might be that you
should weigh. Skip over the fact that he committed perjury.
We all acknowledge that it is said. But now tell me what
that does to Paula Jones, or potentially could do to Paula
Jones, or to one of you, or to one of your spouses, or to one
of the members of your community who wants to have jus-
tice done in the courts.
64
We will examine this claim in Part IV, below.
Sanctions other than criminal punishment are available for judi-
cial lies of little significance, which do not, practically speaking,
threaten to harm another party. In fact, fairness and efficiency de-
mand the adoption of a perjury standard that distinguishes between
different "grades" of lies. This is borne out by a review of the statis-
tics relating to the prosecution of perjury. Despite the many federal
statutes that target false statements, perjury and its false statement
cousins remain offenses neglected by prosecutors. The following
section reviews the facts and figures surrounding the federal false
statement statutes.
C. Federal False Statement Statutes
False statements made in civil depositions or interrogatories for
federal cases may be prosecuted under either one of two broad
62. 145 CONG. REC. S246 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999) (statement by Rep. Ro-
gan).
63. 145 CONG. REC. S268 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Gekas).
64. Id.
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LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:1303
perjury statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 162161 or 18 U.S.C. § 1623.66 Both
sections carry a maximum sentence of five years' imprisonment.
67
Each offense is defined by the same four elements: an oath,
criminal intent, falsity, and materiality. Section 1621 punishes any-
one who has (1) "taken an oath before a competent tribunal... in
any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be
administered" and then (2) "willfully and contrary to such oath states
or subscribes" a (3) "material matter" that (4) "he does not believe to
be true." 68 Section 1623 punishes anyone who (1) "under oath.., in
any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the
United States" (2) "knowingly" makes or uses any (3) "false" (4)
"material" declaration.
69
The courts have interpreted the materiality requirement in these
two statutes identically.70 There are, however, a number of impor-
tant differences between § 1621 and § 1623, but these differences fall
outside the scope of this Comment.71 It is enough to note that Con-
gress enacted § 1623 to "facilitate prosecution of perjury" 72 by
broadening the range of conduct beyond that which § 1621 pro-
scribes. 73 Because it is easier to convict a defendant under § 1623,
this Comment focuses on § 1623 prosecutions.
Sections 1621 and 1623 are just two examples among a host of
federal statutes criminalizing false statements. For example, it is a
federal crime to make false statements in credit applications submit-
ted to financial institutions insured by the FDIC or other federal
agencies; 74 in documents adjusting or canceling farm indebtedness; 75
65. "Perjury generally," 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994).
66. "False declarations before grand jury or court," id. § 1623.
67. See id. §§ 1621, 1623.
68. Id. § 1621(1).
69. Id. § 1623(a).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Mancuso, 485 F.2d 275, 280 n.15 (2d Cir.
1973); see also Michael Jay Kaplan, Annotation, Determination of Materiality
of Allegedly Perjurious Testimony in Prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621,
1622, 22 A.L.R. FED. 379, 386 & n.33 (1975).
71. See Kathryn Kavanaugh Baran & Rebecca I. Ruby, Perjury, 35 AM.
CRiM. L. REv. 1035, 1038-48 (1998), for a discussion of the differences be-
tween the two statutes.
72. Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 107 (1979).
73. See Baran & Ruby, supra note 71, at 1041.
74. See 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1994 & Supp. I 1997).
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in passport applications; 76 and in immigration and naturalization pro-
ceedings.77
The broadest-and, perhaps, the most notorious-of these fed-
eral false statement statutes is 18 U.S.C. § 1001, "Fraud and False
Statements-Statements or entries generally." This statute prohibits
anyone from (a) concealing a material fact, (b) making a materially
false statement, or (c) knowingly using a document that contains a
materially false statement or entry "in any matter within the jurisdic-
tion of the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the Govern-
ment of the United States, knowingly and willfully.
78
This statute has been characterized as the "flubber of all laws,"
because of its "[e]lastic, all-purpose, and fearsome" scope-charac-
teristics that have made it a favorite among independent prosecu-
tors.79 Section 1001 enables an aggressive government investigator
to manufacture a criminal offense by setting a "perjury trap. 80 Sup-
pose the following: A government agent suspects that X has com-
mitted a crime, but has only unearthed suspicious-yet non-
criminal-conduct by X. The agent then questions X about this sus-
picious conduct. If X denies having engaged in it, X will be liable
for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001.81 In effect, the government agent
will have "manufactured" a crime simply by questioning X about
conduct not itself criminal. 2 Of course, X may try to disown
75. See id. § 1026.
76. See id. § "1542.
77. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1994).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994 & Supp. 1 1997).
79. Paul Glastris, 'False Statements': the flubber of all laws, U.S. NEWs &
WORLD REP., Mar. 30, 1998, at 25, 25; see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Perjury
Trap, NEW YORKER, Aug. 10, 1998, at 28, 30 (discussing the Supreme Court's
recent rejection of the "exculpatory no" defense to prosecution under § 1001,
see infra note 82).
80. See Rosen, supra note 79, at 30-31; Alan C. Miller & Judy Pasternak,
Starr's Office Let Tripp Give Details to Jones' Lawyers, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11,
1998, at Al (suggesting that Starr set a perjury trap for Clinton at Clinton's
January 1998 deposition).
81. See Rosen, supra note 79, at 30-31. In Brogan v. United States, 522
U.S. 398 (1998), the Supreme Court held that there is no "exculpatory no" ex-
ception to 18 U.S.C. § 1001: the mere false denial to a government agent's in-
quiry, where it is material to a matter within the agent's jurisdiction, violates
the statute. See id. 408.
82. Justice Ginsburg notes that, although Congress may not have intended
it, § 1001 confers "extraordinary authority... on prosecutors to manufacture
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embarrassing conduct as well as suspicious conduct. Nevertheless,
the knowingly false denial of embarrassing behavior to a government
agent acting within his or her jurisdiction may be prosecuted under
18 U.S.C. § 1001.3 We should keep in mind the broad reach of §
1001, with its wide grant of discretion to federal investigators, when
we consider the proper standard for the materiality limitation on
perjury prosecutions in Part III below.
D. Statistical and Anecdotal Background on Perjury Prosecutions
A review of criminal justice statistics suggests that, despite the
number of statutes proscribing perjury in all its wondrous and dap-
pled variations, many of our contemporaries perjure themselves with
impunity, as well. For example, only 92 of the 60,255 defendants
disposed of in U.S. District Courts in 1996 faced perjury as their
most serious offense--just 0.15%.84 The prosecution rate for perjury
cases is also lower than the prosecution rate for federal criminal
cases generally. In 1993, 729 persons whose most serious suspected
offense was perjury, contempt, or intimidation were the targets of
criminal investigations concluded by U.S. attorneys; 322 of these
suspects were not prosecuted.85 This amounts to a 55.8% prosecu-
tion rate, compared to the 69.1% prosecution rate for all criminal
matters concluded by U.S. attorneys.
86
Nor do perjurers occupy many cells in federal prisons. Only 58
persons convicted of perjury in 1996 were sentenced to prison.
87
Between October 1, 1993, and September 30, 1994, 67 prisoners who
crimes." Id. at 408, 410-12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing a similar
hypothetical).
83. See Rosen, supra note 79, at 31.
84. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1996 450-51 tbl.5.29
(Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1997). It should be noted, however,
that unsuccessful criminal defendants who committed perjury at trial face an
obstruction of justice sentence enhancement. See USSG § 3C1.1 (Nov. 1998).
Thus, the federal perjury statistics reflect the fact that prosecutors need not al-
ways charge a criminal defendant with perjury to punish the defendant for his
or her false testimony.
85. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 84, at 436-37 tbls.5.15
& 5.16.
86. Overall, 75,176 prosecutions resulted from the 108,854 cases handled
by U.S attorneys. See id.
87. See id. at 452 tbl.5.30.
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had been convicted of perjury, contempt or intimidation were re-
leased; their median time served was 12 months.8 8 Finally, during
this same period, there were only 97 federal prison inmates whose
most serious conviction was for perjury, contempt or intimidation.
89
This figure represents just 0.12% of the 78,265 federal inmates at
that time.90
The federal government does not provide statistics tracking
prosecutions for perjury in civil cases, but anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that they are not particularly common. Prosecutors and defense
attorneys across the country have remarked that perjury charges
based on testimony given in civil suits are rare.91 In United States v.
Adams,92 the Sixth Circuit stated that "[tlhe record suggests.., that
prosecutions for perjury have not heretofore been instituted [within
the Western District of Tennessee] in respect of testimony given in
civil proceedings," and drew from this fact, together with other un-
usual facts in the case, an inference that the defendant may have been
the victim of selective prosecution.
93
To be sure, it cannot be said that perjury in civil proceedings is
never prosecuted.94 In fact, some defendants have even been prose-
cuted and convicted for-lying about sex in a civil suit. For example, a
U.S. postal supervisor sued for sexual harassment was recently con-
victed of perjury after she falsely denied in a deposition that she had
sex with a subordinate employee.9 5 She was sentenced to thirteen
months' imprisonment.96 But this sentence may have been the result
88. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1994 80 tbl.6.6 (1998).
89. See id. at 83 tbl.6.9.
90. See id.
91. See David E. Rovella, Will He Escape This Time? Perjury Charge a
Stretch, Say Nation's DAs, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 9, 1998, at Al; Joel Cohen, Per-
jury and Fraud in Civil Proceedings, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 1994, at 1.
92. 870 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1989).
93. Id. at 1145-46.
94. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, Civil Case Perjury is Prosecuted, L.A. DAILY
J., Feb. 19, 1998, at 6 (referring to 8 federal appellate cases involving convic-
tions for civil perjury); Ruth Marcus, Paying the Price for Civil Perjury;
Prosecution May Be Unusual, But it Can Mean Prison, WASH. POST, Mar. 3,
1998, at A4.
95. See Richard A. Serrano, Other Federal Workers Pay High Price for
Perjury, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1998, at Al.
96. See id.
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of the current politicization of pejury rather than a reflection of the
usual fate of parties who lie in civil depositions. At sentencing, the
district judge compared the effects of perjury to the damage wrought
by termites when they get inside a house, concluding, "[a]nd that's
the seriousness of the destruction of... our system of justice, our
entire society for that matter .... And it goes all the way to the
highest levels of our government."97 The defendant was sentenced to
thirteen months in prison so that the judge could, as he put it, "dem-
onstrate to others the seriousness of the responsibility of telling the
truth in court proceedings." 98 The defendant was unlucky enough to
get caught in political crossfire.
Calls for greater punishment for perjury have, indeed, become
politicized in light of the Clinton affair. For example, conservative
pundit Arianna Huffington has organized a group called Citizens
Against Perjury Proliferation to fight the "dirty little secret of our
justice system." 99  "[P]erjury has become epidemic," Huffington
moans, and yet it remains "the least prosecuted crime in the country"
after tax evasion. 00 To check this epidemic, Huffington maintains,
the perjury allegations against President Clinton should be pursued to
the fullest extent.'0 '
Many lawyers agree with Ms. Huffington that perjury in civil
proceedings is indeed "epidemic" and even "customary." 02 If they
are correct, the low incidence of perjury prosecutions stemming from
civil suits results from prosecutorial choice rather than the scrupu-
lousness of parties and witnesses. Lying may well be rampant, but
prosecutors are unwilling or unable to vigorously pursue criminal
charges in such cases. 10 3 Perjury referrals might overwhelm
prosecutorial resources, already challenged by a heavy caseload.
10 4
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. Arianna Huffington, Crusades: Citizens Against Perjury Proliferation
(visited Oct. 8, 1998) <http://www.ariannaonline.com/crusades/capp.html>.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Stanley S. Arkin, Criminal Implications of Perjury in Civil Cases,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 9, 1998, at 3; see also Cohen, supra note 91 (suggesting that
perjury in civil proceedings is common). Of course, it is probably impossible
to prove that perjury is as rampant as these commentators suggest.
103. See Arkin, supra note 102.
104. See People v. Davis, 647 N.E.2d 977, 983 (Ill. 1995) (Bilandic, C.J.,
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Prosecutors may simply consider perjury committed in civil suits to
be less serious than other offenses, unconvinced by the pontifications
of appellate courts regarding the "incalculable harm" civil perjurers
do to the administration of justice. 05 Finally, government prosecu-
tors might be reluctant to allow disgruntled litigants to draw them
into private disputes.
10 6
If it is true that perjury is rampant-a claim that it is no doubt
impossible to prove-then the systematic under-enforcement of per-
jury undermines the deterrent effect of the offense.'07 A narrow in-
terpretation of materiality would limit the criminal conduct to serious
lying; perhaps such a limitation would focus available prosecutorial
resources in such a way that enforcement would be more common,
promoting deterrence. In any case, even if perjury is not quite as
common as some suggest, there are a number of reasons for favoring
a narrow interpretation of materiality for civil perjury. These reasons
are discussed in the next section, following a review of the case law
on the materiality requirement in the context of civil discovery.
II. JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR DETERMiNING MATERIALITY
As discussed above, perjury is deemed to be a crime against the
courts and the administration of justice. At the same time, the mate-
riality requirement imports into the offense a subsidiary concern for
the harm at least potentially threatened to an actual party. In effect,
then, perjury is a "hybrid" offense; its hybrid nature is reflected in
the various ways courts have treated the materiality element. Courts
have formulated different definitions of materiality depending on the
type of proceeding in which the testimony was presented, and, in the
context of civil discovery, they have articulated conflicting defini-
tions of materiality.
In Kungys v. United States,'I 8 the Supreme Court set forth the
primary definition of materiality for all federal false statement
dissenting) (advocating narrow construction of materiality requirement to
"avoid a plethora of such criminal prosecutions" based on civil perjury); see
also Arkin, supra note 102; Cohen, supra note 91.
105. United States v. Holland, 22 F.3d 1040, 1047 (1lth Cir. 1994); see
Arkin, supra note 102.
106. See Davis, 647 N.E.2d at 983 (Bilandic, C.J., dissenting).
107. See infra Part LI.B.4.
108. 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
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statutes. A false statement is material if it had "'a natural tendency
to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of the deci-
sionmaking body to which it was addressed."' 0 9 As numerous courts
have noted, a false statement may be material under this definition
even if it was addressed to a collateral matter. 10 Thus, any misrep-
resentation regarding a witness's credibility is routinely considered
to be material."' Furthermore, as the test itself implies, the false
statement need not have actually influenced the decision-maker to be
deemed material."12
An even broader definition of materiality is employed where the
defendant is charged with committing perjury before a grand jury.
Because of the investigative function of the grand jury, false testi-
mony before a grand jury is deemed to be material if it had the "natu-
ral effect or tendency to influence, impaede, or dissuade the grand
jury from pursuing its investigation."'  Again, the false testimony
need not actually have impeded the grand jury's investigation.
114
This variation of the materiality test was developed in Carroll v.
United States."' Carroll illustrates how broad a construction some
courts give to the materiality requirement. In Carroll, the defendant
had testified before a grand jury investigating a possible violation of
the National Prohibition Act at the defendant's party. 16 Newspapers
reported that a party guest-one Miss Hawley-had bathed in a
bathtub filled with champagne. 1 7 The defendant denied that anyone
at any time was in the bathtub; he also testified that he did not know
if Miss Hawley was present at the party." 8 The jury found that such
testimony was false. 1 9 The Second Circuit concluded that Carroll's
statements were material: by concealing the fact that someone
109. Id. at 770 (quoting Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701
(1956)).
110. See Richard B. Lillich, The Element ofMateriality in the Federal Crime
of Perury, 35 IND. L.J. 1, 6-8 (1959).
111. See id.
112. See Kaplan, supra note 70, at 408.
113. Carroll v. United States, 16 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir. 1927).
114. See Vitello v. United States, 425 F.2d 416, 424 (9th Cir. 1970).
115. 16F.2d951 (2dCir. 1927).
116. See id. at 953.
117. See id. at 953-54.
118. See id. at 952-53.
119. See id. at 952.
1320
PERJURYIV CIVIL DISCOVERY
bathed in the tub, Carroll dissuaded the grand jury from hearing from
a witness such as Miss Hawley, who was likely to have valuable in-
formation concerning the contents of the bathtub. 120 Such informa-
tion was crucial to the grand jury's investigation of Carroll's possible
violation of the National Prohibition Act.121 Hence, even salacious
details can be material.
The proper standard for materiality where the perjury charge is
based on lies made during civil discovery is disputed. As the Fourth
Circuit has recently noted, the traditional Kungys definition "does not
neatly apply when ... the defendant is charged with committing
perjury during a civil deposition. ' 122 A deponent's testimony is not
actually addressed to any decision-making body. Much of a depo-
nent's testimony may never reach the fact-finder. 123 Furthermore,
because of the rules of evidence, much of a deponent's testimony
could never reach the fact-finder.
For these reasons, the circuits are currently split regarding the
proper standard for materiality in perjury prosecutions arising from
civil discovery. The Second and Fifth Circuits apply a very broad
definition of materiality, derived from the grand jury context, while
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits apply a somewhat narrower defini-
tion. 124 Each approach is examined in detail below.
A. The Broad Approach to Materiality in the Civil
Discovery Context
The Second and Fifth Circuits have adopted a broad definition
of materiality when the perjury charge stems from statements made
during the course of civil discovery. Essentially, these circuits apply
a standard of materiality similar to that used in the grand jury con-
text. A deposition or interrogatory response is material if it "might
reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence
120. See id. at 953-54.
121. See id. at 954.
122. United States v. Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 214,225 (4th Cir. 1998).
123. For example, ruling on the scope of discovery in the Jones v. Clinton
suit, Judge Wright noted that "it is very likely that a good deal of the matters
obtained in discovery will not be deemed admissible into evidence ..... Order
at 7, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark. filed Dec. 18, 1997).
124. See Wilkinson, 137 F.3d at 225.
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admissible at the trial of the underlying suit.' l2 5  This language
tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) ("Rule
26(b)"), which allows discovery of any information that is "reasona-
bly calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."'
126
Hence, materiality is equivalent to discoverability. As long as the
discovery request falls within the very liberal scope of Rule 26(b)-
i.e., as long as the opposing party is entitled to receive an answer to
the question-the materiality requirement is satisfied.1
27
The Second Circuit adopted this formulation of materiality in
United States v. Kross.'2 8 In Kross, the defendant was convicted of
perjury based on statements she made while being deposed in a civil
forfeiture action. 129 Specifically, the defendant falsely denied ever
seeing anyone smoke marijuana in the private park that was the sub-
ject of the action. 130 On appeal, the defendant argued that her depo-
sition testimony was not material for the following reasons: her
knowledge of marijuana use in the park could not be imputed to the
park's owner; 13 the mere use of marijuana did not constitute the sort
of serious narcotics crime required for forfeiture; 132 and because the
drug use of which she was aware occurred more than five years prior
to the forfeiture action, it was outside the applicable statute of limi-
tations anyway.
133
The Second Circuit rejected these arguments. It held that the
defendant's truthful response could conceivably have assisted the
government in uncovering additional evidence that the park's owner
had guilty knowledge of marijuana cultivation and distribution in the
125. United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994); cf United
States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 924 (5th Cir. 1991).
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("The information sought need not be admissi-
ble at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence."). See Kross, 14 F.3d at 754; Holley,
942 F.2d at 924.
127. In fact, this is the principal argument advanced by the Office of the In-
dependent Counsel in contending that Clinton's deposition testimony was ma-
terial to the Jones suit. See infra Part IV.B. .b.
128. 14 F.3d 751,754 (2d Cir. 1994).
129. See id. at 752-53.
130. See id. at 753.
131. See id. at 754.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 755.
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park at a later time.134 In other words, the government was entitled
to ask the defendant about any marijuana use she had ever witnessed
in the park because such questioning was "reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 13 Therefore, the de-
fendant's statements were material under a broad standard of materi-
ality.
It should be noted, however, that the Second Circuit adopted this
broad standard of materiality based on the particular facts of the
case. 13  The court noted that forfeiture actions, while civil in form,
require "a nexus between the property and criminal activity.'
37
Thus, the court determined that the definition of materiality used in
the criminal grand jury context supplied the appropriate test.138 It
remains unclear whether the Second Circuit would adopt the broad,
grand-jury based definition of materiality where perjury charges are
based on statements made in a civil suit between private parties.
The Fifth Circuit approved a broad test for materiality in the
civil discovery context in United States v. Holley,139 where the court
held that the defendant's false deposition testimony was material to
an adversarial bankruptcy action. As in Kross, the Fifth Circuit
held that the scope of materiality under § 1623 is as broad as the
permissible scope of discovery under Rule 26(b).14 1 For the Fifth
Circuit, materiality is the equivalent of discoverability.
Holley had testified falsely about a fraudulent letter of credit
that he had issued as chairman of the board of the complainant
bank.142 While the bank's complaint did not list the letter of credit as
a specific instance of fraudulent conduct that rendered Holley's debts
nondischargeable, the court held that Holley's testimony regarding
the letter of credit was material to the bank's complaint. 143 The bank
alleged that Holley committed fraud in three specific credit
134. See id.
135. Id. at 754 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)).
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. 942 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1991).
140. See id. at 918, 921-22, 925.
141. See id. at 924-25.
142. See id. at 918-21 n.5, 921-22.
143. See id. at 924-25.
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transactions by allowing loans to be funded without proper approval
or application procedures. 144 The letter of credit at issue in the per-
jury charge was likewise given without proper approval or applica-
tion procedures. As such, the court stated that it was "directly rele-
vant" to the bank's action and could be used pursuant to Federal Rule
of Evidence 404(b)145 to show the defendant's state of mind regard-
ing his breach of his fiduciary duties. 4 6 The court went on to note
that the letter of credit transaction might have been excludable under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, but that did not affect the materiality
of Holley's deposition testimony, given the standard of materiality
the court adopted.147
Kross and Holley were preceded by United States v. Naddeo,45
in which a district court held that the investigative nature of discov-
ery requires the same definition of materiality to be used in the civil
discovery context as is used in the grand jury context. The court
stated that "[t]he test of materiality goes to questions asked, during
investigation, on a relevant and material subject. The questions pro-
pounded fell within the scope of the Pretrial Order [regarding dis-
covery] and, therefore, in the opinion of the district judge covered an
area within the parameters of the complaint."'
149
In setting forth its test for determining the materiality of testi-
mony in civil depositions, the court in Naddeo relied on United
144. See id. at 924.
145. See id. at 925.
146. See id. at 925. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) states that evidence of
other wrongs, acts, etc., while not admissible to prove "the character of a per-
son in order to show action in conformity therewith," may be admissible "for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident .... ." FED. R. EVID.
404(b).
147. See Holley, 942 F.2d at 925. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 permits a
judge to exclude otherwise relevant evidence where its "probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect." FED. R. EVID. 403.
148. 336 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
149. Id. at 240. The Office of the Independent Counsel [hereinafter OIC]
used similar reasoning in contending that the President's false deposition tes-
timony regarding Lewinsky was material to the Jones suit. The OIC's princi-
pal argument for the materiality of Clinton's deposition testimony was that
Judge Wright had ruled Clinton's affair with Lewinsky discoverable under
Rule 26(b). See infra Part IV.B.1.b.
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States v. Siegel,15° in which Judge Learned Hand formulated the
broadest of all materiality tests. For Hand, testimony before a grand
jury is material if any conceivable answer to the proffered question
could have assisted the grand jury in its investigation. 15 1 As long as
the question itself was within the scope of the grand jury's investiga-
tion, it would make no difference to Hand whether a truthful answer
actually would have led to further fruitful inquiry.152 In response to
the defendant's argument that a truthful answer to the grand jury
would have contributed nothing to its investigation, Judge Hand re-
plied:
The error of the appellants' position is that they confuse the
"materiality" of the question with the "materiality" of the
answer, as though it was proof that the question was im-
material, if the answer would have been so. It is, however,
at once apparent that this substitutes the opinion of the wit-
ness for that of the tribunal as to the "materiality" of the an-
swer. No matter how right the witness might be in believ-
ing that the answer would not contribute to the
investigation, he was bound to leave that decision to the tri-
bunal. A question is "material," no matter what the answer
may be, unless it appears by its terms that the answer can-
not be "material."'
153
For Hand, then, perjury merely required a false response to a
material question.
As with Hand's approach in Siegel, the test for materiality
adopted in Kross and Holley depends exclusively upon the question
the defendant had been asked. As long as the question falls within
the permissible scope of discovery, as defined by Rule 26(b), the de-
fendant's response is automatically material, even if, in hindsight, a
truthful response would have been of no use at all. Clearly, this ap-
proach conceives of perjury as a crime against the administration of
justice at the most abstract and attenuated level, for the false testi-
mony need not ever have threatened the integrity of the proceedings.
150. 263 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1959).
151. Seeid. at533.
152. See id.
153. Id.
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B. A Critique of the Broad Standard of Materiality
There are a number of problems with this broad discoverability
standard for materiality. In fact, statutory grounds, prior case law,
policy considerations, and recent Supreme Court decisions holding
that materiality is a jury question, all counsel against it.
1. Statutory arguments against the discoverability standard
The discoverability standard is flatly inconsistent with the
statutory language at issue. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 targets anyone who
makes a "false material declaration."' 154 Thus, according to the very
grammar of the statute, the materiality required for a perjury prose-
cution is an attribute of the defendant's response. Therefore, the
broad discoverability standard, which looks exclusively to the per-
missibility of the question and ignores the significance of the defen-
dant's answer, conflicts with the plain language of the statute.
155
Further, to equate materiality with discoverability for purposes
of a § 1623 prosecution would conflict with the materiality require-
ment of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Section 1001(a) punishes anyone who,
in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legis-
lative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United
States, knowingly and willfully-(1) falsifies.., a material
fact; (2) makes any materially false.., statement...; or (3)
makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the
same to contain any materially false.., statement ... 156
Section 1001 thus requires both a false statement as to a matter
"within the jurisdiction" of a government agency and a "materially"
false statement. 157 If materiality meant nothing more than that the
defendant had been asked a permissible question, the materiality re-
quirement repeated in 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1), (2), and (3) would be
redundant, for the fact that the defendant was questioned about a
matter within the jurisdiction of a government agency establishes
that the question was permissible. Therefore, materiality must
plainly mean more than a response to a proper question, lest we
154. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1994).
155. See Lillich, supra note 110, at 9 (noting that Judge Hand must have
overlooked this fact).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (Supp. 111997).
157. Id.
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violate the "cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision
should be construed to be entirely redundant."'
5 8
Moreover, in 1996, Congress revised § 1001 to make explicit
the materiality requirement of subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3). 59 Prior
to this revision, some circuits-including the Second Circuit-held
that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (a)(2) and (3) did not contain a materiality re-
quirement.' 60 This revision suggests that Congress intended for the
courts to seriously apply the materiality requirements in the federal
false statement statutes containing them.
1 6 '
2. Inconsistencies between the discoverability standard and the
Supreme Court's approach to materiality in
United States v. Gaudin
162
The Supreme Court has likewise reaffirmed the significance of
the materiality requirement, holding in United States v. Gaudin and
Johnson v. United States163 that materiality is an essential element of
the federal offense of perjury. As such, materiality is now a question
for the jury. 164 However, it is not clear to what extent-if at all-
Gaudin changed the legal standard that should be applied to materi-
ality.
Kross and Holley were decided prior to the Court's Gaudin de-
cision. Gaudin itself did not challenge the definition of materiality
set forth in Kungys,165 so it may be that Gaudin did not disturb
the Kross/Holley standard of materiality. However, the reasoning
158. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988). The Court in Kun-
gys also expressed a preference for applying a uniform construction to the ma-
teriality requirements contained in many of the federal false statement statutes.
Thus, the Court rejected a specialized definition of materiality for purposes of
8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), in favor of the standard definition of materiality. See id. at
769-70.
159. Prior to the 1996 revision, § 1001 referred to the materiality require-
ment only in subsection (a)(1). See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir. 1984);
United States v. Rinaldi, 393 F.2d 97, 99-100 (2d Cir. 1968).
161. Congress's 1996 revision of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (a)(2) and (3) to make
the materiality requirement explicit belies the OIC's claim that the materiality
requirement is a de minimis one.
162. 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
163. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997).
164. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 518-19.
165. See id. at 509.
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underlying Gaudin's determination that materiality is a jury question
is inconsistent, at least in spirit, with the way materiality is ap-
proached under Kross and Holley.
In Gaudin, the Court noted that a determination of materiality is
well-suited to the jury in that it involves "'delicate assessments of the
inferences a "reasonable [decision-maker]" would draw from a given
set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him. This
approach to materiality is reflected in the jury instructions on the is-
sue approved by the D.C. Circuit. The instructions state that a mate-
rial declaration is one that concerns "a fact that would be of impor-
tance to a reasonable person in making a decision about a particular
matter or transaction."'167 Thus, after Gaudin, materiality requires
consideration of the common-sense significance of the defendant's
testimony in light of the historical facts and legal requirements of the
underlying case. In contrast, under Holley and Kross, materiality re-
quires nothing more than a bare assessment of the trial court's exer-
cise of discretion under Rule 26(b), divorced from the actual, com-
mon-sense significance of the deposition testimony at issue.
In United States v. Akram, 168 the Seventh Circuit suggested that
Gaudin does, in fact, justify a substantive departure from the tradi-
tional standard used to determine materiality. The court noted in
dicta that just because certain testimony is relevant and admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence does not mean that the testi-
mony is "material" for purposes of § 1623.169 For example, although
Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) permits cross-examination of a wit-
ness concerning specific instances of conduct to establish the wit-
ness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, "certain lies on
cross-examination might be too trivial to count as being relevant to
the question of credibility" under § 1623.170 In some cases, "the de-
fendant's credibility is itself a minor consideration and not one capa-
ble of influencing the jury's decision."171
166. Id. at 512 (quoting TSC Indust., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
450 (1976)) (alteration in original).
167. United States v. Winstead, 74 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
168. 152 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 1998).
169. See id. at 701-02.
170. Id. at 702.
171. Id.
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Interestingly, the court noted that similar reasoning may apply to
"other crimes, wrongs, or acts" evidence admitted under Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b): the bare fact of admissibility is not,
standing alone, determinative of materiality. 7 2 Akram suggests that
an assessment of materiality after Gaudin must include consideration
of the probative value of the evidence at issue in addition to its ad-
missibility. It remains to be seen whether other courts will follow
Akram's lead.
In any event, Gaudin is of enormous practical significance to the
materiality issue. Now, the jury may exercise its power to "indulge
tender mercies even to the point of acquitting the plainly guilty," as
the New York Appellate Division remarked some years ago when it
assigned the determination of materiality to the jury under New York
law.' 73 Thus, juries may be hesitant to convict a defendant who lied
about a discoverable but insignificant matter.
3. The conflict between the discoverability standard and
prior case law
As discussed above, the approach to materiality adopted by
Kross and Holley parallels the approach to materiality advanced by
Judge Hand in United States v. Siegel. It is therefore notable that
Hand's own Second Circuit has retreated from Siegel.
In United States v. Mancuso,174 the Second Circuit stated that
testimony before a grand jury is only material if "a truthful answer
could conceivably have furthered the inquiry.,, 175 The court recog-
nized that Siegel suggested "that materiality exists unless the ques-
tion, divorced from the context in which it was asked, could not have
elicited a material reply," but that "such a view cannot be maintained
. ,176 In considering materiality, a court must examine "the fac-
tual background to determine whether the question had some bearing
on a subject that was material to the proceeding, and whether a
truthful answer might possibly have aided the inquiry."'177 Similarly,
172. See id.
173. People v. Clemente, 136 N.Y.S.2d 202, 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954).
174. 485 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1973).
175. Id. at281 n.17.
176. Id.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
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the Second Circuit in United States v. Freedman178 stated that "in or-
der for a knowingly false statement to be material ... it must be
shown that a truthful answer would have been of sufficient probative
importance to the inquiry so that, as a minimum, further fruiful in-
vestigation would 
have occurred."'
179
Mancuso and Freedman thus focus the materiality inquiry pre-
cisely where it belongs: on the relationship between the defendant's
answer and the underlying objectives of the inquiry.
4. Policy objections to the discoverability standard
The broad materiality standard adopted in Kross and Holley is
unsound from a policy perspective, as well. First, it is not justified
from the perspective of deterrence. The broad materiality standard
renders virtually any lie criminal. But as noted above, prosecutors
are already loath to involve themselves in disputes between private
litigants. 8 ' The fact remains, and is likely to remain for some time,
that the vast majority of individuals who lie in civil depositions will
never be prosecuted for perjury. The broad materiality standard
would seem merely to increase the quantity of technically criminal
conduct that is immune from prosecution.' Thus, this broad stan-
dard actually exacerbates the under-enforcement of perjury. Such a
pattern of under-enforcement undermines deterrence, which is, of
course, one of the central purposes of punishment.18 2 In fact, even if
the conventional wisdom regarding the frequency of perjury is mis-
taken, the very appearance of under-enforcement undermines deter-
rence. 83  In either case, a broad standard of materiality, which
178. 445 F.2d 1220 (2d Cir. 1971).
179. Id. at 1226-27 (emphasis added).
180. See supra Part II.D.
181. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, DETERRENcE: THE
LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 158 (1973) (discussing "general immu-
nity," which arises when "a certain type of behavior, although actually prohib-
ited by statute, has not been prosecuted and appears to have been tolerated by
the authorities for a period of time, [with the result that] the public may come
to believe that the threatening agency does not seriously intend the legal
threat").
182. See generally id. at 158-72 (discussing correlation between effective
enforcement and deterrence); Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Ef-
fects ofPunishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 961-62 (1960) (same).
183. See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW
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renders almost any lie sufficient to support a perjury prosecution in
theory, is not justified by deterrence theory.
Furthermore, deterrence theory may not justify civil perjury in
general, whether it is broadly or more narrowly defined. In fact, the
common law recognized the ineffectiveness of perjury prosecutions
as a deterrent to lying under oath: parties were incompetent to testify
as witnesses in their own cases until the middle of the nineteenth
century.184 Despite the existence of criminal sanctions for false tes-
timony in civil suits, available ever since Parliament passed the first
perjury statute in 1563, parties were nevertheless considered to be
inherently untrustworthy witnesses. 18  This may suggest that the
criminalization of civil perjury is inherently flawed, at least from the
point of view of deterrence. We shall consider alternatives to crimi-
nal sanctions for perjury below; the point here is that there is little
deterrence justification for an unenforceably broad definition of per-
jury.
The discoverability standard is also inconsistent with the other
fundamental purpose of punishment, retribution. Central to the re-
tributive view of punishment is the concept of proportionality. 86
Kant's classic formulation of retribution emphasizes the primacy of
proportionality:
But what is the mode and measure of Punishment which
Public Justice takes as its Principle and Standard? It is just
the Principle of Equality, by which the pointer of the Scale
of Justice is made to incline no more to the one side than
the other. It may be rendered by saying that the undeserved
evil which any one commits on another, is to be regarded as
perpetrated on himself.
187
AND rrs PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 117-18 (1995); ZvMING &
HAWKINS, supra note 181, at 162, 167-71; Andenaes, supra note 182, at 963-
64.
184. See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 18, §§ 575, 576, at 804-08, 817-18.
185. See id.
186. See, e.g., IGORPRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 12, 79-81,
85-94 (1989) (stating that one of the five central tenets of the retributive view
of punishment is that "[p]unishment ought to be proportionate to the offense
(the lex talionis)"); C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 154 (1987).
187. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 196 (W. Hastie trans.,
1887).
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Punishing someone for perjury where their truthful testimony
could have had no practical impact on a particular proceeding ex-
ceeds the bounds of proportionality. The defendant has not caused
harm to individual adversaries in such situations. Rather, the defen-
dant suffers punishment for the harm he or she has caused to the ju-
dicial system. But how can we measure such a speculative harm?
The Eleventh Circuit's characterization of this harm as "incalcula-
ble" would seem to be literally true. 188 Therefore, there cannot be
any proportionality between the discrete punishment meted out to the
defendant and the harm the defendant has caused the judicial system,
a harm that cannot be calculated and cannot even be proven. The
two evils are incommensurate; thus, the Kantian imperative is frus-
trated.
Ultimately, the policy supporting the discoverability standard
comes down to the simple notion that "there would appear to be no
sufficient reason why a deponent should not be held to his
oath ... ,,189 However, this rationale proves too much. As will be
discussed in Part III.D below, witnesses may be held to their oaths
without being subjected to perjury prosecutions. Moreover, as we
have seen, perjury is something more than a crime against the ad-
ministration of justice, simpliciter. The materiality requirement
demonstrates that perjury is, at least to a certain extent, also deemed
an act of fraud against the legal rights of an opposing party. One
should not be punished for perjury if such rights were never endan-
gered in the first place.
For these reasons, a narrow construction of materiality should be
employed in perjury prosecutions based on civil discovery. The fol-
lowing section discusses the narrower approaches to materiality in
the civil discovery context adopted by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits.
C. Narrower Approaches to Materiality in the Civil Discovery
Context
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have adopted a narrower definition
of materiality. Under this approach, the false statement must not
only have been properly discoverable, it must also have had the
188. United States v. Holland, 22 F.3d 1040, 1047 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
189. United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 924 (5th Cir. 1991).
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tendency to affect the outcome of the underlying civil suit.190 This
approach better accords with the notion that perjury involves the
threat of harm to a particular proceeding and to the rights of a par-
ticular party.
The Ninth Circuit articulated this narrower definition of materi-
ality in United States v. Clark.'91 In Clark, the defendants had been
charged and convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 as a result of false
deposition testimony they provided during the course of their em-
ployment discrimination lawsuit against the Oakland Police Depart-
ment.192 The defendants claimed that the Department had discrimi-
nated against them on the basis of race when it suspended them
ostensibly for violating the department's sick leave policy.193 In
their depositions, they falsely claimed that they had missed work due
to illness on a particular occasion and denied that they had ever
abused the department's policy.194 The court held that such false
statements were material to the defendants' civil suit, for a truthful
answer could have influenced a jury in deciding whether the defen-
dants were disciplined for legitimate or discriminatory reasons.
195
Thus, the defendants' testimony was material even under this nar-
rower definition of materiality.
In United States v. Adams,196 the Sixth Circuit addressed the
proper standard for the materiality of a false statement made in a
civil deposition. The defendant had been convicted of perjury for
false statements she made in her deposition during the course of her
sex discrimination suit against the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission ("EEOC"). 97 The defendant had incorrectly stated in
her deposition that the earnings figures she supplied to the EEOC as
part of her application for employment came from her actual Sched-
ule C income tax form when, in fact, they came from a Schedule C
190. See United States v. Adams, 870 F.2d 1140, 1148 (6th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Clark, 918 F.2d 843, 846-47 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on
other grounds by United States v. Keyes, 95 F.3d 874, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1996).
191. 918 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1990).
192. See id. at 844-45.
193. See id. at 844.
194. See id. at 845.
195. See id. at 846-47.
196. 870 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1989).
197. Seeid. atll41.
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worksheet.' 98 The court stated the test for materiality as "whether a
truthful statement might have assisted or influenced the tribunal in its
inquiry" and held that the defendant's statement was immaterial. 199
The government failed to establish any "nexus" between the dis-
crimination suit and the defendant's false statement: it would have
made no difference to the civil suit whether the earnings figures
came from an actual Schedule C or from a Schedule C worksheet.
20 0
As in Clark, the court in Adams articulated a definition of mate-
riality that is narrower than the mere discoverability standard
adopted by the Second and Fifth Circuits. However, the false state-
ment at issue in Adams would probably not even meet the standard
for materiality adopted by the Second and Fifth Circuits. The lack of
any nexus between the discrimination suit and the source of the de-
fendant's earnings figures would appear to render the deposition
questions beyond the scope of Rule 26(b) itself.
As we have seen, it is quite likely that both Adams and Clark
would have been decided the same way under the broad test for ma-
teriality adopted by the Second and Fifth Circuits. However, the nar-
rower test formulated by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits would produce
divergent results in certain circumstances. In particular, the circuit
split would be most pronounced where the defendant's deposition
testimony, while properly discoverable, would be inadmissible at
trial. After all, testimony that could never reach the ultimate deci-
sion-maker could hardly be said to possess the natural capacity to in-
fluence that decision-maker.
If the deposition testimony is not admissible at trial because it
would be irrelevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401,201 it would
not be material under the tests adopted by the Ninth and Sixth Cir-
cuits. Under the broad Second and Fifth Circuit approach, however,
the testimony's ultimate irrelevance would have no bearing on its
materiality, as long as the testimony was given in response to a
198. See id. at 1142.
199. Id. at 1147 (citing United States v. Swift, 809 F.2d 320, 324 (8th Cir.
1987)).
200. See id.
201. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED.
R. EvID. 401.
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discovery request that comported with Rule 26(b). It should be re-
called, however, that the Fifth Circuit deemed the actual statements
at issue in Holley to be "directly relevant" to the underlying suit.
20 2
What if the deponent's testimony would be inadmissible at trial
on grounds other than relevancy? For example, what if the depo-
nent's testimony constituted improper character evidence barred by
Federal Rule of Evidence 404?03 Again, it would seem that such
testimony, if never admitted, would not possess the capacity to influ-
ence the ultimate decision-maker in the case. Thus, under the Sixth
and Ninth Circuit approach, the deponent's inadmissible testimony
would not be deemed material, while under the Second and Fifth
Circuit approach, it would be-subject only to Rule 26(b).
It should be noted, however, that a perjury defendant may not
object on materiality grounds where his false testimony was improp-
erly admitted at trial. The defendant's testimony is not rendered im-
material merely because it should have been-but was not-ex-
cluded from consideration by the trier of fact under the rules of
evidence. Even if a proper, though unsuccessful, objection to the of-
fending question was made, the fact that the defendant's response
was capable of influencing the jury, even in an impermissible man-
ner, suffices to establish materiality.20 4
Where the perjury charge is based on inadmissible statements
made during discovery that never reached the ultimate decision-
maker, a different rule should apply. Such statements are more akin
to inadmissible testimony properly excluded by the trial court. Few
cases have addressed the materiality of such testimony-perhaps be-
cause most prosecutors would never press charges in such circum-
stances. However, an interesting case that does address the material-
ity of inadmissible and properly excluded testimony is Ford v.
202. United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 925 (5th Cir. 1991).
203. "Other acts" evidence is not admissible "to prove the character of a per-
son in order to show action in conformity therewith." FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Rapoport, 545 F.2d 802, 805 n.8 (2d Cir.
1976) ("A witness at a trial should not be given license to employ false state-
ments which might influence the jury merely because the parties have failed to
object to the testimony or the judge erroneously determined that it was admis-
sible."). This rule traces its pedigree back to a 19th century case. See Regina
v. Phillpotts, 169 Eng. Rep. 514 (Q.B. 1851).
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State.2°5 In Ford, the defendant had been a state witness in a prior
drug trial.2° 6 In chambers, the defendant was asked if he had ever
been court-martialed.2 °7 He falsely responded "no. 20 8 But because
such evidence of the defendant's court-martial could not be admitted
to impeach the defendant's credibility in any event, the court held
that the false denial was not material and therefore not perjurious.
20 9
The following section summarizes the approach to materiality
advanced in this Comment. A more radical proposal is then consid-
ered: leaving perjury in civil discovery for trial courts themselves to
sanction.
D. Recommendations
1. A narrow standard of materiality
At the very least, a narrow approach to materiality should be
adopted where perjury is based on lies told during civil discovery.
The appropriate standard would be whether the deponent's testimony
had the capacity to affect the trier of fact in the underlying lawsuit.
This means that the deponent's testimony should be relevant to the
underlying suit, within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 401,
and reasonably likely to be admissible under the other rules of evi-
dence.
This standard of materiality is preferable to the discoverability
standard for a number of reasons. First, it gives full force to the lan-
guage of the federal perjury statutes.210 It also limits perjury
205. 610 So. 2d 370 (Miss. 1992); cf State v. Lake, 147 S.E. 473, 474-75
(W. Va. 1929) (holding that defendant's false statement as to a relevant but in-
admissible matter was immaterial; defendant's false statement had been prop-
erly excluded by trial court). But cf People v. Davidson, 227 Cal. App. 2d
331, 335, 38 Cal. Rptr. 660, 662 (1964) (holding that defendant's false state-
ment was material, although it constituted inadmissible hearsay which the trial
court had properly excluded, relying on California Penal Code section 122,
which states that "[i]t is no defense to a prosecution for perjury that the ac-
cused was not competent to give the testimony, deposition, or certificate of
which falsehood is alleged," see CAL. PENAL CODE § 122 (West 1988)).
206. See Ford, 610 So. 2d at 371.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 373-74.
210. See supra Part III.B.1.
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prosecutions to those lies which a reasonable person would consider
to be important in the proceedings in which they were given, conso-
nant with the Supreme Court's approach in Gaudin.211 Finally, it is
consistent with a conception of perjury as, in part, a crime against in-
dividuals. Thus, punishment for this more limited range of conduct,
with its more readily identifiable harm, is in better accord with a re-
tributive view of punishment. Finally, because those false statements
that only cause harm to the administration of justice in the abstract
are not often prosecuted anyway, this approach closes the gap be-
tween the legal definition of the criminal conduct and actual patterns
of enforcement, thus enhancing deterrence.
2. Express decriminalization of perjury in civil discovery
It is not surprising that the vast majority of those charged with
perjury in connection with civil suits were actually parties to those
underlying suits.212 Civil parties commit perjury because it can be
profitable. Judges, however, can make perjury very unprofitable.
Trial courts have a number of resources to keep parties in line during
the course of a civil proceeding, particularly during the discovery
phase. The federal district courts have the "inherent power to regu-
late litigation and to sanction litigants for abusive practices," a power
that is "deeply rooted in the common law tradition. 2 13 Given this
inherent power, and given the irregular and unpredictable enforce-
ment of perjury in the civil discovery context by prosecutors, the of-
fense of perjury should not apply to civil discovery.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) codifies the district
courts' inherent power to sanction abusive practices committed dur-
ing discovery. 14 Rule 37(b)(2) prescribes a range of sanctions that
trial courts may impose on parties and witnesses for their failure to
211. See supra Part III.B.2.
212. In an informal review of 35 cases from federal appellate and district
courts over the past ten years involving perjury based on civil actions, all but
two of the perjury defendants had been parties to the underlying civil action.
See, e.g., United States v. Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Holland, 22 F.3d 1040 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. McAfee, 8
F.3d 1010 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.
1992); United States v. Clark, 918 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1990).
213. Vargas v. Peltz, 901 F. Supp. 1572, 1579 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
214. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
1337June 1999]
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:1303
obey the court's discovery orders. For example, the trial court may
order that the facts the adverse party sought to establish through
discovery are to be taken as true; it may refuse to allow the offending
party to assert particular claims or defenses; it may strike pleadings
or impose a default judgment on the offending party; finally, it may
treat the failure to obey a discovery order as a contempt of court.
215
In addition, the injured party will ordinarily be awarded reasonable
attorneys' fees. 2 16 Such sanctions should be more than adequate to
deter conduct primarily pursued because of its profitability.
Rule 37(b)(2) sanctions have been imposed where a party has
lied in depositions or interrogatories submitted pursuant to court or-
der.217 Trial courts have struck pleadings, estopped parties from
contesting certain allegations, and dismissed suits and entered default
judgments as punishment for perjury committed in discovery pro-
ceedings.218 In addition, trial courts have sanctioned parties under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for submitting falsified docu-
ments during discovery.
219
Rule 37(b)(2)(D) states that a court may treat the failure to obey
a discovery order as a contempt of court.220 Civil contempt is em-
ployed to coerce a party or witness to comply with a court order or to
compensate an opposing party for harm caused by the contemnor's
defiance of the order.22 1 28 U.S.C. § 1826 authorizes courts to con-
fine the contemnor for up to eighteen months in order to coerce
215. See id. at 37(b)(2)(A), (B), (C), (D).
216. See id. at 37(b)(2)(E).
217. See, e.g., Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton,
989 F. Supp. 8, 16-17 (D.C. 1997); Association of Am. Physicians & Sur-
geons, Inc. v. Clinton, 837 F. Supp. 454,458 (D.C. 1993).
218. See, e.g., Vargas, 901 F. Supp. at 1572, 1582-83; Boron v. West Tex.
Exports, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 1532, 1537-38 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Amway Corp. v.
Shapiro Express Co., 102 F.R.D. 564, 569-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Nittolo v.
Brand, 96 F.R.D. 672, 676-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
219. See, e.g., Pope v. Federal Express Corp., 974 F.2d 982, 985-86 (8th Cir.
1992) (remanding trial court's award of attorneys' fees under Rule 11 solely to
determine parties' ability to pay).
220. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(D).
221. See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258,
303-04 (1947); New York Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339,
1351 (2d Cir. 1989); Hess v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 846
F.2d 114, 115 (2d Cir. 1988).
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compliance.222 Criminal contempt is employed to punish a party or
witness for past disobedience of a court order.223 Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 42(a) authorizes courts to impose summary pun-
ishment for criminal contempt where the contempt was committed in
the presence of the court and the judge certifies to having seen or
heard it.224 However, where the punishment imposed on the contem-
nor is serious-for example, imprisonment for more than six
months-the contemnor has the right to a jury trial.2 25
Perjury, standing alone, does not constitute contempt.226 In ad-
dition to the usual elements of perjury, the would-be contemnor must
have obstructed the court in the performance of its duty.227 For ex-
ample, in Jones v. Lincoln Electric Co.,228 a district court held that a
witness could not be held in contempt merely for testifying falsely-
although noting that it was a "close question." 229 While the witness
may have violated his oath, he did not violate a court order to testify
truthfiflly, and thus he did not impede the court's authority to con-
duct an orderly trial.23° In some cases, however, perjury may be
punished as civil or criminal contempt.231 Where a party has violated
a court discovery order by providing perjured deposition testimony,
the additional element of obstruction of justice may be present.
Finally, the adversarial system itself possesses informal means
to "punish" and deter perjury. Parties risk a great deal when they or
their witnesses decide to lie under oath. If the jury detects the false
testimony, that party's credibility with the jury will be lost. One trial
222. See 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (West 1988).
223. See, e.g., Terry, 886 F.2d at 1351.
224. See FED. R. CRAM. P. 42(a).
225. See 18 U.S.C. § 3691 (1994); Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506,
515-17 (1974).
226. See In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 228 (1945); Ex parte Hudgings, 249
U.S. 378, 382-84 (1919).
227. See Michael, 326 U.S. at 228.
228. 990 F. Supp. 1093 (N.D. Ind. 1997).
229. Id. at 1095
230. See id.
231. See, e.g., In re Bongiorno, 694 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1982) (grand jury wit-
ness held in civil contempt because of false assertion of inability to remember).
In fact, Judge Susan Webber Wright, the trial judge in the Jones v. Clinton suit,
recently held President Clinton in contempt of court for his deposition testi-
mony concerning Monica Lewinsky. See John M. Broder, Clinton is found to
be in contempt on Jones lawsuit, N.Y. TIMEs, April 13, 1999, at Al.
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manual exhorts litigators to constantly remind their witnesses to tell
the truth, for "[i]f the witnesses are not credible, you have no chance
of establishing your own credibility. Jurors see right through wit-
nesses who are trying to help the case with cute, incomplete, or oth-
erwise tricky answers. Very few people are good at lying or at-
tempting to deceive through incomplete answers." 232 And the jury is
then likely to punish the untruthful party when it renders its verdict.
Of course, the opposing lawyers will do all they can to bring the
false testimony to the jury's attention. False testimony given at the
discovery stage provides special ammunition for opposing lawyers,
who are eager to impeach witnesses by contradiction, pointing out to
the jury the inconsistencies between the witness's current testimony
and previous sworn statements. Moreover, there is a certain expec-
tation that opposing witnesses will often be cagey and evasive-and
sometimes will cross the line separating evasion from perjury. Far
from relying on the truthfulness of opposing witnesses, parties pay
skilled litigators handsomely to uncover the deceit.
Given the formal and informal means to check civil perjury in-
herent in the judicial system, there is little reason to expend valuable
prosecutorial resources on it. Indeed, both judges and juries already
have wide discretion to punish perjurers. Nothing seems to be
gained by allowing prosecutors to exercise equally wide discretion to
punish an offense in a necessarily irregular-perhaps even selec-
tive-manner.
IV. MATERIALITY AND THE CLINTON-LEWINSKY SAGA
As the Supreme Court stated in Kungys, determining the materi-
ality of a given statement involves an inquiry into "what would have
232. STEPHEN D. EASTON, How TO WIN JURY TRIALS: BUILDING
CREDIBILITY wrrH JUDGES AND JURORS 8 (1998). Behavioral psychologists
doubt whether humans are particularly effective "lie detectors" and further
doubt whether "experts" such as law enforcement officials are really any better
at detecting lies than the public at large. See ANDREAS KAPARDIS,
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 211-25 (1997). Never-
theless, the courts have insisted that witnesses' courtroom demeanor provides
important clues regarding credibility, particularly for "experts" such as judges
and lawyers. See, e.g., Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188-89
(1981).
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ensued from... knowledge of the misrepresented fact. 233 This re-
quires, as we have seen, a "delicate assessment of the inferences a
reasonable decision-maker would draw from a given set of facts and
the significance of those inferences to him."234 We turn now to as-
sess the significance of the inferences that a reasonable decision-
maker in the Paula Jones sexual harassment suit would draw from
the sexual relationship between William Jefferson Clinton and
Monica Lewinsky. Did Clinton's denial of a sexual relationship with
Monica Lewinsky at his January 17, 1997, deposition constitute a
"material false declaration"?
As the Court states in Gaudin, one of the "subsidiary questions
of purely historical fact" that must be addressed before reaching the
ultimate question of materiality is "what decision was the [decision-
maker] trying to make? ' 235 We begin, then, with a brief overview of
the Paula Jones suit, focusing particularly on the battle over discov-
ery and Jones's asserted grounds for making the discovery request at
issue.
A. Jones v. Clinton and its Progeny
1. The Jones suit
On May 6, 1994, Paula Corbin Jones, a former Arkansas state
employee, filed a civil suit against President Clinton in the Eastern
District of Arkansas. 236 Jones alleged that Clinton sexually harassed
her while he was Governor of Arkansas and she was a state em-
ployee.237 Jones claimed that she was summoned to Clinton's hotel
room at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock, where Clinton exposed
himself to her and asked her to perform oral sex on him.238 Jones
claimed that she was the victim of quid pro quo and hostile work en-
vironment sexual harassment and that such harassment eventually
233. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 775 (1988).
234. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512 (1995) (internal quotations
and alteration omitted).
235. Id.
236. See Complaint, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark. filed
May 6, 1994).
237. See id. at 60.
238. See id. at 7, 20-21.
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forced her to quit her job with the Arkansas Industrial Development
Commission.
2 59
The case was assigned to Judge Susan Webber Wright. Judge
Wright held that a sitting president is entitled to temporary immunity
from private lawsuits arising out of his unofficial acts and accord-
ingly stayed Jones's suit.240 The Eighth Circuit reversed Judge
Wright's ruling241 and the Supreme Court affirmed.242 However, in
remanding the case to Judge Wright, the Supreme Court stated that
"[t]he high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief Executive,
though not justifying a rule of categorical immunity, is a matter that
should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding, including the
timing and scope of discovery." 243  The Court noted that Judge
Wright possessed "broad discretion" to manage the discovery proc-
ess in a way that would not interfere with the President's official du-
ties.
244
2. The battle over discovery
In fact, the next battle waged by the parties concerned the scope
of discovery. The Jones team sought a broad scope of discovery
covering all of Clinton's extramarital sexual history since he was the
Attorney General of Arkansas. For example, on October 1, 1997,
Jones sent Clinton a set of interrogatories that asked him to provide
"the name... of each and every individual.. ." with whom he had
"had sexual relations," "proposed having sexual relations," or whom
he "kissed during a private meeting" when he was the Attorney Gen-
eral of Arkansas, Governor of Arkansas, and President of the United
States.
245
Clinton's attorneys attempted to restrict discovery to "purported
incidents, if any, of non-consensual conduct occurring in plaintiffs
work place while she was employed there."246 Jones's far-reaching
239. See id. at 39-40, 61-62.
240. See Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690, 699 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
241. See Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354, 1363 (8th Cir. 1996).
242. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 710 (1997).
243. Id. at 707.
244. Id. at 706.
245. Second Set of Interrogatories from Plaintiff to Defendant Clinton Nos.
10, 11, 16, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark. filed Oct. 1, 1997).
246. Memorandum in Support of President Clinton's Motion for a Protective
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discovery requests, Clinton contended, were "irrelevant to the claims
made by plaintiff, and [were] sought for the purpose of harassing and
embarrassing the President." 247 Jones countered by emphasizing the
liberal construction given to Rule 26(b).248 The issue, Jones argued,
was "whether there is any possibility that the discovery might, di-
rectly or indirectly, lead to admissible evidence."
249
Jones offered a number of grounds to support her claim that
virtually every facet of Clinton's extramarital sex life was discover-
able.2 5 0 In general, Jones contended that Clinton's sexual conduct
both before and after he was Governor might be relevant and admis-
sible to determine his intent and state of mind in making his alleged
sexual advances on her, under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).251
Similar acts by Clinton, if discovered, would tend to show that
Clinton intended to harass Jones "based on her gender and motivated
by his libido.'252 In fact, if Jones had discovered any acts of sexual
assault by Clinton, they would be admissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 415 to show that Clinton had a propensity to engage in the
sort of behavior Jones alleged in her complaint.253
Further, Jones argued that even Clinton's consensual relation-
ships were discoverable insofar as they might support Jones's quid
pro quo sexual harassment claim.254 Jones alleged that she was the
victim of disparate treatment: Clinton used his governmental
authority to cause employment favors or benefits to be bestowed on
women who consented to his sexual overtures, while Jones and other
women who refused Clinton's advances were denied employment
Order at 2, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark. filed Nov. 5, 1997)
[hereinafter Defendant's Protective Order Memorandum]. As Jones pointed
out, however, Clinton himself did not adhere to such a limitation in his own
discovery requests. See Plaintiff's Memorandum Concerning Defendant
Clinton's Request for Status Conference at 4, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-
290 (E.D. Ark. filed July 29, 1997).
247. Defendant's Protective Order Memorandum, supra note 246, at 1.
248. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion of Defendant
Clinton to Limit Discovery at 2-3, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D.
Ark. filed Nov. 3, 1997) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Discovery Memorandum].
249. Id. at 2.
250. See id. at 4-25.
251. See id. at 6-13.
252. Id. at 8.
253. See id. at 15-19.
254. See id. at 8, 20-22.
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benefits.2 55  Jones further contended that Clinton's consensual
relationships might be relevant and admissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 406 as "habit, 256 to show that Clinton was a "sex ad-
dict., 257 Finally, Jones pointed out that consent in a given case could
only be established following a full investigation.258
In a series of discovery rulings, Judge Wright allowed Jones to
explore Clinton's sexual relationships with subordinate employees
both in Arkansas and Washington.259 Judge Wright noted that dis-
covery "by its very nature takes unforeseen twists and turns and goes
down numerous paths, and whether those paths lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence often simply cannot be predetermined.
' 260
Judge Wright did, however, require Jones to establish a "factual
predicate" prior to any questioning relating to the so-called "Jane
Does.",261 Jones first had to establish that the Jane Doe in question
knew Clinton and had "some contact" with him; second, that she was
a state or federal employee before, during, or after such contact.
2 62
Jones could then proceed to inquire into Clinton's sexual contact
with the Jane Doe, provided Jones had a good-faith basis for the
255. See id. at 8. However, it would appear that plaintiffs may prove their
quid pro quo claims through circumstantial evidence that other employees who
submitted to the employer's sexual demands received employment benefits,
but only where the employer actually coerced the other employees' submis-
sion. See Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197, 1199-1201 (D. Del. 1983)
(describing pattern of coercive conduct by employer toward other female em-
ployees). The DeCintio court noted that "submission, in [the quid pro quo]
context, clearly involves a lack of consent and implies a necessary element of
coercion or harassment." DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308.
256. "Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an or-
ganization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eye-
witnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on
a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice."
FED. R. EvID. 406.
257. Plaintiff's Discovery Memorandum, supra note 248, at 14.
258. See id.
259. See Order at 7-8, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark. filed
Dec. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Dec. 18 Order]; Clerk's Minutes of In Camera
Hearing at 1, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark. filed Nov. 24,
1997); Order at 3-4, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 8,
1998).
260. Dec. 18 Order, supra note 259, at 7-8.
261. Id. at 1-3.
262. See id. at 4.
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2632inquiry.263 While conceding that this limitation on discovery was
only "minimal protection," Judge Wright did note that "[i]n the typi-
cal case, the Court would not bother to restrict deposition testimony"
at all.264 Among these Jane Does was one Monica Lewinsky.265
Clinton was deposed on January 17, 1998. Jones's attorneys
asked Clinton numerous questions concerning Monica Lewinsky, in-
cluding whether he had ever engaged in "sexual relations" with
her.266 Clinton denied having "sexual relations" or a "sexual affair"
with Lewinsky.267 Ten days earlier, Lewinsky had signed an affida-
vit in which she also denied having a "sexual relationship" with
Clinton.268
On January 16, 1998, the Office of the Independent Counsel
("OIC") received permission to expand its jurisdiction to investigate
whether Lewinsky and Clinton had obstructed justice in the Jones
suit.2 69 Twelve days later, the OIC filed a motion with Judge Wright
requesting a stay of discovery in light of the OIC's newly-expanded
criminal investigation.270 Judge Wright granted the OIC's motion as
it related to the Lewinsky matter and further ruled that all evidence
concerning Lewinsky would be excluded from the case.271
Judge Wright excluded the Lewinsky evidence under the bal-
ancing test of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, concluding that its
263. See id.
264. Id. at 7.
265. Jones' attorneys learned of Lewinsky through Linda Tripp. Apparently,
the Jones camp contacted Tripp through Lucianne Goldberg, a conservative,
fiercely anti-Clinton gossip columnist. Tripp provided Jones' attorneys details
of Lewinsky's affair with Clinton shortly before Clinton's deposition-after
Tripp began cooperating with the OIC. It appears that the OIC never in-
structed Tripp to keep quiet about the matter-leading some to believe that
the OIC was setting a perjury trap for Clinton. See Alan C. Miller and Judy
Pasternak, Starr's Office Let Tripp Give Details to Jones' Lawyers, L.A.
TIMES, October 11, 1998, at Al.
266. See Referral to the United States House of Representatives pursuant to
Title 28, United States Code, § 595(c) Submitted by the Office of the Inde-
pendent Counsel, September 9, 1998 [hereinafter Starr Report], at Introduction,
text accompanying nn. 1028-31; I.A. 1, text accompanying nn.6-8.
267. Id.
268. Id. at Introduction (text accompanying nn.952-60).
269. See id. at Introduction (text accompanying n.10).
270. See Jones v. Clinton, 993 F. Supp. 1217, 1218 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
271. See id. at 1218-19.
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"probative value" was "substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect" in the form of undue delay pending the OIC's investiga-
272 WieJdakoldetion. While Judge Wright acknowledged that the Lewinsky evi-
dence "might be relevant" to the plaintiffs case, she nevertheless
ruled that such evidence was not essential to the "core issues" of the
case.273 Judge Wright "assumed for the sake of argument" that the
Lewinsky evidence, as developed through further discovery, would
be relevant to Jones's case,274 but she "concluded that such hypo-
thetical evidence was still nothing more than Rule 404(b) evidence"
and therefore could not be used to show that Jones herself was the
victim of sexual harassment.275 Moreover, Wright noted that "some
of this evidence might even be inadmissible under Rule 608(b). ' 76
Thus, Judge Wright neither confimed nor denied the relevance
or admissibility of the subject of Clinton's contested deposition tes-
timony. Rather, she held that the minimal probative value of the
Lewinsky evidence was not such as to justify a delay in the pro-
ceedings.
B. Application of the Legal Standards of Materiality to the
Lewinksy-Related Evidence
1. The OIC's determination that Clinton's deposition testimony
was material
In its Legal Reference accompanying its Referral to Congress,
the OIC purported to address the materiality of Clinton's deposition
272. Id. at 1219, 1221 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403).
273. Id. at 1219, 1222 (emphasis added).
274. Id. at 1222.
275. Id. at 1220. Evidence of other wrongful acts cannot be used to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith, but
may, instead, be used to prove intent, absence of mistake, motive, and the like.
See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Because Clinton denied that the alleged incident at
the Excelsior Hotel ever occurred, it is difficult to see how such limited evi-
dence would be relevant to Jones' suit.
276. Id. at 1219. However, Wright was careful to point out that she was ex-
cluding the Lewinsky evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and was
not ruling on its admissibility. See id. at 1221, 1222 n.8. Under Rule 608(b),
an attorney may, on cross-examination, inquire into specific instances of a wit-
ness' conduct relating to the witness' character for untruthfulness.
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testimony concerning Monica Lewinsky.277 The OIC contended that
a number of judicial rulings had already established the materiality of
Clinton's testimony: Judge Wright's rulings on discovery;278 Judge
Wright's order excluding the Lewinsky matter from the Jones suit;
2 79
and a ruling by the D.C. Circuit addressing the materiality of Lewin-
sky's false affidavit filed in connection with a motion to quash her
subpoena in the Jones suit.28 0 These claims will be examined in light
of the standards of materiality in the civil discovery context reviewed
in Part III.
a. the District of Columbia Circuit ruling
First, the D.C. Circuit did not rule that Lewinsky-related evi-
dence was material to the Jones suit. Rather, the court ruled that
Lewinsky's false affidavit was material to her motion to quash.28' In
February 1998, the OIC subpoenaed Lewinsky's former attorney,
Francis Carter, to testify before the Whitewater grand jury.
282
Lewinsky resisted the subpoena based on attorney-client privilege.
283
The OIC then countered that the privilege was inapplicable under the
crime-fraud exception because Lewinsky consulted Carter for the
purpose of committing perjury in the Jones case.284 Lewinsky's re-
sponse was that the crime-fraud exception did not apply because her
affidavit in the Jones case was immaterial, and hence could not have
constituted perjury.2 8 1 The D.C. Circuit court rejected this claim.
286
Lewinsky had submitted her affidavit as part of her motion to quash
the earlier subpoena issued by Jones's attorneys.2 87 Her affidavit
was clearly material to this motion, for it was capable of influencing
the decision-maker in deciding whether Lewinsky should be
277. See Office of Independent Counsel, Legal Reference [hereinafter Legal
Reference] at § I.C.5.d.
278. See id. at § I.C.5.d.i.
279. See id.
280. See id. at § I.C.5.d.ii.
281. See In re Sealed Case, 162 F.3d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
282. See id. at 672.
283. See id. at 672-73.
284. See id. at 673.
285. See id.
286. See id. at 674.
287. See id.
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deposed.288 However, the court did not purport to address the ques-
tion of whether Lewinsky's affidavit was material to the underlying
Jones suit.
b. Judge Wright's discovery rulings
The OIC asserted that Judge Wright had determined the materi-
ality of Clinton's deposition testimony concerning Monica Lewin-
sky, for purposes of a perjury prosecution, simply by ruling that
Clinton's relationship with Lewinsky was discoverable. 289 In com-
ing to this conclusion, the OIC relied on the broad materiality stan-
dard adopted in Kross and Holley.290 This approach to materiality
turns exclusively on the question the alleged perjurer had been asked;
it totally disregards the significance-or lack of significance-of a
truthful answer. The OIC itself concedes as much: "if the question
falsely answered was itself permissible under the rules of discovery,
then the false answer is deemed material."
291
As we have seen, there are strong arguments against equating
the standard for materiality in perjury prosecutions with the standard
established by Rule 26(b) for defining the scope of discovery. To
summarize: This approach violates the plain language of 18 U.S.C. §
1623, which requires a false material declaration. Moreover, this
approach does not warrant a "delicate assessment of inferences"-
the touchstone of every determination of materiality, as the Supreme
Court held in Gaudin-but merely requires one to pass on the pro-
priety of a judge's exercise of discretion under Rule 26(b). Thus, it
ignores those aspects of the materiality question that led the Supreme
Court to hold that materiality is an issue for the jury. Finally, this
approach is flawed from a policy standpoint, for it ignores the differ-
ence between a trivial lie and a lie that poses a real and serious dan-
ger to the particular proceedings in which it was told.
c. Judge Wright's January 29, 1998 order
The OIC also asserted that in her order of January 29, 1998,
Judge Wright "concluded that Lewinsky-related evidence might be
288. See id.
289. See Legal Reference, supra note 279, § I.C.5.c.
290. See id.
291. See id.
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capable of influencing the ultimate decision in the lawsuit" but nev-
ertheless excluded the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence
403.292 Oddly, the OIC transforms Judge Wright's Rule 403 order
into a "conclusion" that the Lewinsky evidence, and hence Clinton's
deposition testimony about Lewinsky, was material to the Jones suit.
But such a transformation distorts the significance of Judge Wright's
ruling, which she further explained in a March 9, 1998 decision.
Judge Wright's "conclusion" regarding the significance of
Lewinsky-related evidence was a purely hypothetical exercise pursu-
ant to Rule 403's balancing test. Jones had contended that Judge
Wright misapplied Rule 403 because she excluded Lewinsky-related
evidence "without knowing the substance of the evidence"--neces-
sarily, as she disallowed plaintiff from pursuing further discovery
into the Lewinsky matter. Judge Wright responded that she
assumed, strictly for the sake of argument, that any such
evidence would show that the President engaged in the
same type of behavior with Ms. Lewinsky that he is alleged
to have engaged in with plaintiff-that he conditioned job
benefits on sexual favors and attempted to conceal an al-
leged sexual relationship. z94
Nevertheless, Judge Wright ruled that the probative value of the evi-
dence, thus imagined, was still substantially outweighed by the un-
due delay it would cause.295 Even assuming a best case scenario for
the plaintiff, Judge Wright believed that the Lewinsky evidence
could amount to "nothing more than Rule 404(b) evidence, i.e., evi-
dence of other alleged wrongful acts ... ,,296
Of course, Judge Wright was forced to consider the relevance of
Lewinsky-related evidence to the Jones suit from a hypothetical per-
spective, since she did not have access to the facts surrounding
Clinton's relationship with Lewinsky. But why would the OIC cite
Judge Wright's January 29th Order to establish the materiality of
Lewinsky-related evidence to the Jones suit? After spending months
establishing the facts of Clinton's relationship with Lewinsky
292. See id. § II.C.5.d.i.
293. Jones v. Clinton, 993 F. Supp. 1217, 1220 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
294. Id.
295. See id. at 1219-1220.
296. Id. at 1220.
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through volumes of grand jury testimony, the most the OIC could do
to support its contention that Lewinsky-related evidence was material
to the Jones suit was to refer back to Judge Wright's assumption that
it might turn out to be relevant, an assumption Judge Wright made
before she knew anything about it.
In fact, as the OIC's investigation established, Clinton's rela-
tionship with Lewinsky was fundamentally different from his alleged
conduct toward Jones. It was purely consensual and did not consti-
tute a quid pro quo for job benefits. Its very relevance to the Jones
suit may be disputed. What follows is a fact-bound assessment of in-
ferences a reasonable juror would draw from Clinton's relationship
with Lewinsky and a discussion of the significance of those infer-
ences for the Jones suit.
2. Application of a narrow standard of materiality to Clinton's
deposition testimony
The Lewinsky-related evidence proved to be far less significant
than Judge Wright imagined in her hypothetical.297 In fact, Clinton's
testimony relating to Lewinsky would likely be immaterial under the
narrow standard of materiality developed in Part III.D.l. Under that
standard, deposition testimony is only material if it is relevant and
otherwise admissible in the underlying suit.
a. relevance
The stark differences between Clinton's relationship with
Lewinsky and his alleged conduct towards Jones arguably render the
Lewinsky-related evidence irrelevant under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 401. In other words, Clinton's relationship with Lewinsky
may not have "any tendency to make... more probable" Clinton's
alleged conduct towards Jones.
298
First, Clinton's sexual contact with Lewinsky was far from un-
welcome.2 9 9 Indeed, Lewinsky herself initiated it.300 On November
15, the day on which their sexual relationship began, Lewinsky
297. See id.
298. FED. R. EVID. 401 (West 1998).
299. See Starr Report, supra note 266, at Introduction (text accompanying
n.151).
300. See id.
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"raised her jacket in the back and showed [Clinton] the straps of her
thong underwear," while she and Clinton were conversing alone in
the Chief of Staffs office. 30 1 Later that night, Clinton, who was
alone in George Stephanopoulos's office, saw Lewinsky pass
through the hallway.302 He motioned for her to come in. Lewinsky
then entered and told Clinton that she had a "crush" on him.30 3
Clinton invited her into his private study and she accepted. After a
brief conversation in which they acknowledged the "chemistry" be-
tween them, Clinton asked Lewinsky if he could kiss her; she said
yes.304 A few hours later, Clinton asked Lewinsky if she would like
to meet him in Stephanopoulos' office, and she agreed. With the
lights out, Lewinsky unbuttoned her jacket; Clinton touched her
breasts; and Lewinsky performed oral sex on him.30 5
Further, there were no allegations that Clinton conditioned any
employment benefits on sex. Lewinsky accepted a paid White
House position on November 13, 1995-two days before her first
sexual contact with Clinton. Furthermore, the Deputy Chief of Staff
may have dismissed Lewinsky from her position at the White House
and transferred her to the Pentagon on account of her relationship
with Clinton-perhaps even over Clinton's objection. On April 6,
1996, Lewinsky was dismissed from her White House position and
transferred to the Pentagon.30 6 She was very upset about this trans-
fer, and believed that she was dismissed from the White House be-
cause of her relationship with Clinton.30 7 Clinton later asked Deputy
Chief of Staff Evelyn Lieberman about Lewinsky's dismissal, and
Lieberman acknowledged that she was responsible for it.308  Ac-
cording to Lewinsky, Clinton told her that Lieberman fired her be-
cause she was spending too much time with him.
30 9
It is therefore difficult to see how Clinton's relationship with
Lewinsky has "any tendency to make... more probable" Clinton's
301. Id.
302. See id. at Introduction (text accompanying n. 153).
303. Id.
304. Id. at Introduction (text accompanying n.154).
305. See id. at Introduction (text accompanying n. 161).
306. See id. at Introduction (text accompanying nn.299-303).
307. See id. at Introduction (text accompanying nn.306-08).
308. See id. at Introduction (text accompanying n.345).
309. See id. at Introduction (text accompanying nn.308 & 343).
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alleged conduct towards Jones. There is no indication that Lewinsky
"submitted" to Clinton's sexual overtures in order to receive favor-
able employment benefits. As the Second Circuit has noted, "sub-
mission," in the quid pro quo context, "clearly involves lack of con-
sent and implies a necessary element of coercion or harassment."
310
However, Rule 401 establishes a very liberal rule of relevancy; per-
haps Clinton's relationship with Lewinsky is still legally relevant to
the Jones suit, despite its consensual nature, by making it somewhat
more probable that Clinton would be willing to engage in sexual ac-
tivities with a subordinate female employee.
b. admissibility
The Lewinsky-related evidence would almost certainly not be
admissible for the purpose just stated. In essence, it is relevant on
this basis only to establish that Clinton had a propensity to engage in
sexual activities with subordinate female employees. In other words,
it constitutes evidence of other acts "to prove the character of a per-
son in order to show action in conformity therewith," a use forbidden
by Federal Rule of Evidence 404.3 " Jones, in fact, had argued that
Clinton's sexual propensity would be admissible under Federal Rule
of Evidence 415.312 But Rule 415 only applies to other instances of
sexual assault, which are admissible to establish a propensity to
commit other sexual assaults.313 Of course, Clinton's relationship
with Lewinsky was not a sexual assault, so Rule 415 does not ap-
ply.
314
310. DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 307-08 (2d
Cir. 1986).
311. "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissi-
ble for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion ... ." FED. R. EvID. 404(a). "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith." FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
312. See Plaintiffs Discovery Memorandum, supra note 248, at 15-19.
313. In a civil case based on a party's alleged commission of sexual assault
or child molestation, Rule 415 permits the admission of "evidence of that
party's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault or child
molestation" for any relevant purpose. FED. R. EVID. 415(a).
314. See Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 667-68 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (not-
ing that Clinton's alleged conduct towards Jones did not constitute a sexual as-
sault either).
1352
PERJURY1N CIVIL DISCOVERY
Jones had also contended that "other acts" evidence would be
admissible under Rule 406, "Habit; Routine Practice," to show that
Clinton was a "sex addict., 315 However, Jones did not cite a single
case to support her contention that Rule 406 could be used in this
way, and, indeed, any such attempt would almost certainly fail.316
In her March 9, 1998, ruling, Judge Wright suggested that the
Lewinsky-related evidence might have been admissible under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 404(b).317 Rule 404(b) admits other acts evi-
dence to prove such things as "motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident...
,318 Jones had argued that Clinton's sexual harassment of other fe-
male employees would demonstrate Clinton's intent to discriminate
on the basis of gender, a required element of her § 1983 equal pro-
tection claim.319 But no such intent to harass Jones could be inferred
from Clinton's relationship with Lewinsky, given its consensual na-
ture.
Jones's strongest argument for admitting the Lewinsky-related
evidence under 404(b) would have been that it demonstrated a com-
mon scheme or plan on Clinton's part to engage in sexual liaisons
with subordinate female employees. 320  Such a common scheme
would tend to show that Clinton engaged in the lewd conduct at the
315. Plaintiff's Discovery Memorandum, supra note 248, at 13-15.
316. See id. The advisory committee note to Rule 406 approvingly quotes
McCormick, who defines habit as a "person's regular practice of meeting a
particular kind of situation with a specific type of conduct ..... The doing of
the habitual acts may become semi-automatic." FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory
committee's note (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 162, at 340).
Clinton's alleged "habit" of propositioning subordinate female employees, as
illustrated by his affair with Lewinsky, lacks the specificity required to be ad-
missible under Rule 406. For example, such behavior could hardly be said to
constitute a "semi-automatic" response to a particular type of situation.
317. See Jones v. Clinton, 993 F. Supp. 1217, 1220 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
318. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
319. See Plaintiff's Discovery Memorandum, supra note 248, at 6-13.
320. See generally EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT
EVIDENCE §§ 3:22-3:24 (1998) (discussing three types of plans supporting ad-
missibility under 404(b): sequential plans, chain plans and, more controver-
sially, unlinked plans); Manuel A. M~ndez & Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
California Supreme Court's About-Face on the Plan Theory for Admitting
Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 473
(1995) (criticizing unlinked plan theory of admissibility as violating prohibi-
tion on use of character evidence).
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Excelsior Hotel as Jones alleged. However, the Eighth Circuit has
held that, in order to admit "other acts" evidence to demonstrate the
existence of a common scheme or plan, the evidence must be "simi-
lar in kind and close in time to the crime charged."32 1 In particular,
where the defendant's sexual conduct is at issue, the Eighth Circuit
has stated that it is "hesitant to affirm the admission of evidence of
prior sexual acts or crimes committed against persons other than the
victim of the charged offense."
322
United States v. LeCompte is instructive. In that case, the
Eighth Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction for abusive sexual
contact with his eleven-year-old niece.323 The trial court erroneously
admitted evidence that the defendant had sexually abused another
niece, of similar age, some ten years prior to the charged offense.
324
Although the charged and uncharged conduct were similar in several
respects-in each case, the abuse followed game playing and expo-
sure; the victims were of the same age and of the same relationship
to the defendant-the court nevertheless held that the two episodes
did not evidence a common plan.325 The court noted that "[t]he vic-
tims were different, and the events were far apart in time. Absent
more specific linkage, such evidence is relevant to 'plan' or 'prepa-
ration' only insofar as it tends to prove a propensity to commit
crimes, which Rule 404(b) prohibits."
326
321. United States v. Sanchez, 963 F.2d 152, 155 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting
United States v. O'Connell, 841 F.2d 1408, 1422 (8th Cir. 1988)); see United
States v. Baker, 82 F.3d 273, 276 (8th Cir. 1996) ("remarkably similar" extor-
tion of other motorists properly admitted to show plan).
322. United States v. LeCompte, 99 F.3d 274, 277 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting
United States v. Yellow, 18 F.3d 1438, 1440 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also
United States v. Has No Horse, 11 F.3d 104, 105-06 (8th Cir. 1993) (evidence
that defendant propositioned other teen-aged girls not admissible under "plan"
theory to prove that defendant committed statutory rape of eleven-year-old
girl); United States v. Fawbush, 900 F.2d 150, 151 (8th Cir. 1990) (testimony
that defendant sexually abused his own daughters not admissible to prove that
defendant sexually abused daycare children).
323. See LeCompte, 99 F.3d at 279. It should be noted that the government
was not able to admit the uncharged sexual misconduct evidence under Federal
Rules of Evidence 413 or 414 because it did not provide the defendant with
sufficient notice, as required by those Rules. See id. at 276.
324. See id. at 277-78.
325. See id. at 278.
326. Id.
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The Lewinsky evidence would surely fail the Eighth Circuit's
test for common scheme or plan evidence. First, as discussed above,
there is very little similarity between the alleged Excelsior Hotel in-
cident and Clinton's affair with Lewinsky.327 Second, there is no
"specific linkage" connecting the two episodes. The OIC's investi-
gation did not uncover any overarching plan by Clinton to condition
government employment benefits on sexual submission. If anything,
Lewinsky's experience demonstrated that having a sexual relation-
ship with Clinton was an employment liability and that Clinton had
little, if any, control over the hiring and firing of White House staff.
In short, the Lewinsky-related evidence was of dubious rele-
vance and admissibility in the underlying Jones suit. Therefore, it is
not the sort of evidence which "would be of importance to a reason-
able person in making a decision about" Paula Jones's sexual har-
assment suit.328 Further, no court has held that deposition testimony
of similarly tenuous relevance and admissibility, given in a civil suit
between private parties, satisfies the materiality requirement for
perjury. Therefore, under the materiality standard proposed in this
Comment, the Clinton-Lewinsky testimony cannot serve as a basis
for civil perjury.
V. CONCLUSION
Materiality is an essential element of the federal offense of per-
jury. Its inclusion in the offense indicates that perjury is something
more than merely a crime against the administration of justice at the
most abstract level. Only those lies that in some way threaten the
rights of others constitute perjury.
The materiality requirement should be taken seriously where
perjury is predicated on lies made during civil discovery. A broad
standard of materiality in this context---one that equates materiality
with discoverability-is flawed from a number of perspectives, and
should be rejected. At a minimum, statements made during the
course of discovery should only be considered material if they are
relevant to, and would likely be admissible in, the underlying suit.
More fundamentally, criminal sanctions may not be the most
327. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
328. United States v. Winstead, 74 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (dis-
cussing jury instructions on materiality).
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effective measure for keeping civil perjury in check. Judges and ju-
ries-not prosecutors-should sanction lies told in civil discovery.
Alan Heinrich*
* J.D. candidate, May 2000. I wish to express my gratitude to Professors
Laurie Levenson and David Leonard for offering their insightful and improv-
ing criticism of earlier versions of this Comment and for being so generous
with their time and support.
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